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( 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The District is trying to distract the Court from the true crux of this matter. What 
is genuinely at issue is Sorf s constitutional right to seek redress against a governmental 
entity, and whether an individual can be stripped of a legal claim as a result of a default 
judgment even though the claim was not addressed in the default. 
Through mistake, surprise, inadvertence and/or excusable neglect, a default 
i 
judgment was entered against Sorf. Despite satisfying the applicable standard, the trial 
court denied Sorf s Motion to Set Aside and thereby finalized the terms of the default. 
Enforcement of the default judgment resulted in a taking of Sorf s property by a 
governmental entity. Accordingly, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 13(d), Sorf moved for 
leave to file an after-acquired counterclaim. The trial court denied Sorf s Motion for 
Leave and deprived him of any opportunity for redress. The default orders Sorf to remove 
$150,000 worth of improvements from his backyard and to comply with an extensive list 
of regulations that were unilaterally created by the District for the District's benefit. 
It is the District's position that the result of a default should include not only entry 
of the relief sought in the complaint, but also loss of all legal claims that arose subsequent . 
to the default. Such a rule cannot be reconciled with the Utah Constitution. One cannot 
be deprived of a redressable claim simply because default was entered on earlier issues. 
To promulgate such a rule in this case would unfairly prejudice Sorf and would establish 
negative precedent in Utah that would reach far beyond the realms of takings law. 
The useful purpose and financial value of Sorf s home is at stake in this litigation. 
As such, the potential consequences are far too great to allow the District's authority to 
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be determined without a trial on the merits. Just because default was entered as to the 
claims filed by the District, that cannot possibly mean that Sorf is out of luck with regard 
to his taking claim. The default should not act as a bar to Sorf s inverse condemnation 
action. The decisions of the trial court denying Sorf s Motion to Set Aside and Motion 
for Leave to File were an abuse of discretion and must be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
SORFS MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT. 
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly advised that when considering a motion to set 
aside a default judgment, the trial court should be inclined towards "granting relief... to 
the end that the party may have a hearing." Lund v. Brown, 11 P.3d 277, f 10 (Utah 
2000). Moreover, "it is quite uniformly regarded an abuse of discretion to refuse to 
vacate a default judgment where there is reasonable justification or excuse for the 
defendant's failure to appear, and timely application is made to set aside." Id. at f^ 11 
(citation omitted.) Sorf provided reasonable justification for his failure to answer the 
District's Complaint and timely filed a Motion to Set Aside. Accordingly, the trial court 
abused its discretion in refusing to vacate the default judgment. 
1. The Trial Court Failed to Make Adequate Findings of 
Fact as to All of the Rule 60(b) Reasons Proferred by Sorf. 
Just because Sorf argued the Rule 60(b) requirements in his briefmgss does not 
mean that the trial court made adequate findings of fact as to all of the proffered reasons. 
The District is seeking to limit the Court's focus to only the language found in the Order 
denying Sorf s Motion to Set Aside. The District's efforts must be rejected. 
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{ 
During the hearing on Sorf s Motion to Set Aside, Judge Fratto only made 
findings of fact as to the existence of excusable neglect. Judge Fratto did not issue 
findings of fact concerning mistake, surprise or inadvertence. 
THE COURT: Yes. Now, I appreciate everyone's presentation. I'm 
prepared to make a decision. The matter is in front of me as a motion to set 
aside the default judgment. It is a Rule 60(b) motion, pled as a 60(b) 
motion. It has two prongs to the analysis. The first is that there must be, in 
this case, it appears to me, invoked the excusable neglect. I should set 
aside the judgment as a result of excusable neglect. . . . { 
* * * * 
MR. BELNAP: And I understand your ruling, but the rule also speaks of 
mistake and inadvertence, which I understand your analysis of the letter, 
but the letter can certainly -
THE COURT: Well, Mr. Belnap, I'm going to stop you there. I appreciate 
the other - and there's other factors in the rule, also, but it appears to me 
the only one that would be applicable in this instance and with what 
excuses have been given is excusable neglect, and, for the reasons I've 
already stated, I do not see that there has been a showing here of excusable 
neglect. 
(Transcript at p. 56-63 (starting at R. 556)(Add. 3)(emphasis added).) Despite Judge 
Fratto's clear ruling, the District prepared an Order that stated "Defendant has not made 
an adequate showing of excusable neglect, mistake, or inadvertence . . . . " (R. 353- -
354)(emphasis added.) The Order was drafted broadly by the District for the District's 
benefit. Sorf objected to the Order and the language contained therein. (R. 350-
352)(Add. 1.) Thereafter, at a hearing on May 12, 2011, Judge Frattp made statements in 
open court that clearly contradicted the Order. (See Transcript at p. 30-32 (starting at R 
558)(Add. 2).) The terms of the Order do not accurately reflect what Judge Fratto 
actually decided. As such, the Court cannot rely on language in the Order as being 
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accurate and/or binding. The Court must consider all factual information that relates to 
the denial of Sorf s Motion to Set Aside, and must remand this matter for a determination 
as to all of the proffered Rule 60(b) reasons. 
The trial court failed to support its denial of Sorf s Motion to Set Aside with 
adequate findings of fact. According to Hernandez v. Baker, 104 P.3d 664, 666 (Utah 
App. 2004), the trial court needed to make adequate findings of fact as to "any . . . reason 
specified in rule 60(b)" (i.e., mistake, surprise, inadvertence and excusable neglect) 
(emphasis added). The District did not address or distinguish Hernandez in any way and 
thus, it remains controlling authority. Judge Fratto's ruling was based only on whether 
excusable neglect was present. Judge Fratto did not issue findings of fact with regard to 
mistake, surprise or inadvertence. (Transcript at pp. 56-63 (starting at R. 556)(Add. 3).) 
As such, he did not fully address the reasons why default was entered against Sorf. Judge 
Fratto's actions were improper and amount to an abuse of discretion. This matter must be 
remanded to the trial court to make findings as to whether the default judgment was 
entered against Sorf because of mistake, surprise or inadvertence. 
The District also failed to distinguish Lund v. Brown, 11 P.3d 277 (Utah 2000). In 
Lund, the Utah Supreme Court stated that relief under Rule 60(b) requires only that the 
moving party show "they possessed a reasonable, good faith belief as to the reasons the 
default was entered. Id, at 280 (emphasis added). Sorf made such a showing. Sorf did 
not act blatantly or willfully to ignore pleading deadlines. Default was entered due to 
excusable neglect, genuine mistake, surprise and/or inadvertence. While the Complaint 
and Summons were delivered to Sorf s house, the woman at the home did not accept 
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them. By the time Sorf returned home, the papers were gone. The first document Sorf 
actually received in this matter was a letter from the District expressing willingness to 
discuss an "amicable resolution." (R. 118.) Based on that letter and subsequent 
conversations with the District's counsel, Sorf had a reasonable and good faith belief that 
the parties would work together to reach a resolution before a complaint was filed. 
(Declaration of Z. Sorf at f 52 (R. 307)( Add. 4).) As soon as Sorf became aware of the 
default judgment, he retained counsel and initiated efforts to set the default aside. 
The District has tried to paint a picture suggesting Sorf intentionally ignored this 
case and willingly turned his back on the court. Such a depiction makes no sense and is 
completely inaccurate. Sorf s home is his pride and joy. He recently spent $150,000 to 
improve the backyard. He did so for the purpose of personal enjoyment and residential 
investment. No one in their right mind would knowingly or intentionally jeopardize their 
home by not answering a complaint and risking a default judgment. Sorf has been 
actively engaged and cooperative with the District. He met with District employees on 
two separate occasions for inspection of his backyard improvements. Neither employee 
informed Sorf that his landscaping violated the SLA easement and neither employee 
requested Sorf cease landscaping. (Dec. of Z. Sorf at ffi[ 24-34 (R. 305 & 306)(Add. 4).) 
If a District employee had told Sorf to stop landscaping he would have. (Dec. of Z. Sorf 
at Tj 35 (R. 306)(Add. 4).) A stop-work order was not posted on Sorf s property until 
August 2010. By then, the backyard improvements were two days away from 
completion. (Dec. of Z. Sorf at ^ 44 (R. 307)(Add. 4).) Pursuant to the District's request, 
and in order to facilitate the District's access to the SLA, Sorf installed a gate on the 
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north side of his property and provided the District with a key to the lock. (Dec. of Z. 
Sorf at | 40-42 (R. 306 & 307)(Add. 4).) Sorf has spoken with the District's counsel in 
an attempt to resolve the underlying matter. Sorf s actions do not show blatant disregard 
or willful ignorance. Sorf simply made a mistake about the status of the parties' 
discussions. Sorf believed the parties were negotiating prior to pursuing litigation, while 
the District was actually negotiating simultaneous to pursuing litigation. This is a 
perfect case of mistake, surprise and inadvertence. 
The District cited to Arbogast Family Trust v. River Crossings, L.L.C., 191 P.3d 
39 (Utah App. 2008) in attempts to further its argument that default was not entered due 
to excusable neglect. Arbogast is distinguishable from this matter and thus, fails to 
support the District's position. In Arbogast, a loan repayment dispute arose between the 
Arbogast Family Trust and River Crossings. Arbogast filed a complaint and served it on 
Crossing's out-of-state counsel. On June 28, 2006, Crossing's out-of-state counsel 
communicated a settlement offer to Arbogast's counsel. The next day, June 29, 2006, 
Arbogast's counsel sent a letter rejecting the offer and stating: 
My client has previously granted your client an extension of time within 
which to answer the complaint. However, given the present state of the 
case, I am, on behalf of my client, hereby requesting that your client file an 
Answer to the complaint within twenty (20) days of the date of this letter. 
Id at 41 & 42. Crossings failed to file an answer and thus, the trial court entered default. 
The trial court denied Crossing's motion to set aside and an appeaf ensued. The Utah 
Court of Appeals upheld the decision and found that no excusable neglect, inadvertent 
surprise or mistake existed because Crossings had counsel at the time of the events at 
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issue, counsel was served with the complaint, and counsel received a letter stating that a 
complaint had been filed and that an answer was due. In this case, unlike Arbogast, Sorf 
was not represented by counsel when the District filed its Complaint and the District's 
Complaint was not served on an attorney. Further, there was no correspondence between 
the District, Sorf and/or an attorney demanding an answer be filed. Accordingly, 
Arbogast is factually distinguishable and fails to suggest an absence of excusable neglect 
in this matter. 
2. Sorf Has Demonstrated Meritorious Defenses to the Underlying 
Action. 
Despite claims to the contrary, Sorf has not argued that the default should have 
been set aside because he has meritorious defenses. Rather, Sorf properly argued that 
based on his reasonable explanation for not answering the District's Complaint coupled 
with his meritorious defenses, it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny his 
Motion to Set Aside. As explained above, during a court hearing held after the Order 
denying Sorf s Motion to Set Aside had been entered, Judge Fratto made statements that 
clarified and corrected language in the Order. There is no confusion in Judge Fratto's 
subsequent statements. He unequivocally explained that no consideration of Sorf s 
defenses was done and that no determination as to the merits of Sorf s defenses was 
made. (See Transcript at p. 30-32 (starting at R 558)(Add. 2).) Sorf made the necessary 
showing to have the default set aside under Rule 60(b). Therefore, the trial court had a 
duty to consider whether a meritorious defense had been presented. Failure to consider 
Sorf s defenses was an abuse of discretion. 
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The fact that Sorf asserted 19 affirmative defenses in his proposed Answer but 
argues only four on appeal in no way suggests Sorf has conceded the unargued defenses 
lack merit. Sorf would have liked to argue all 19 defenses on appeal, but had to be 
selective in deciding which arguments to assert in order to comply with page length 
restrictions. Sorf s proposed Answer satisfied the meritorious defense requirement 
because if proven, would have precluded recovery by the District. 
a. The District's Regulations Exceed the Express Language of 
the Easement. 
Sorf asserted a meritorious defense concerning the overbroad scope of the 
District's regulations. Sorf has correctly framed the argument on this issue. The focus is 
not whether the District has authority to promulgate regulations. The proper analysis is 
whether the District's regulations exceed the express language of the original easement. 
Even if the District has power to promulgate regulations concerning the SLA, such 
authority is not without limits. In fact, the District recognized limits to its authority by 
initiating the underlying case. In its Complaint, the District asked the trial court to 
"declar[e] [the District's] property rights; . . . declar[e] [the District's] regulatory 
authority; . . . [and] declar[e] [the District's] rights and powers to remove Defendant's 
improvements . . . ." (Complaint at f 61 (R. 16)(Add. 5).) If the District had the type of 
unlimited authority it suggests in its brief, there would have been no reason to file the 
underlying matter or to ask the trial court to make a determination as to the scope of its 
regulatory authority, rights and powers. 
The District's current authority over the SLA easement cannot be any broader than 
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the rights granted by the original easement. "Where an easement is created by a written 
instrument, like an agreement, a grant, or a deed, the rights founded on such an instrument are 
limited to the uses and extent fixed by the instrument." Gillmor v. Macey, 121 P.3d 57, 67 (Utah 
App. 2005)(citation omitted.) The District has pieced together language from multiple 
easement deeds in attempts to make the original grant of rights seem broader than it truly 
was. (See Brief of Appellee at p. 27.) The original easement deed entered in 1946 was a 
simple, one page document that gave the District authority "to construct, reconstruct, 
operate and maintain a pipeline or pipelines on, over and across the following described 
property . . . ." (R. 39)(Add. 6.) When the District deeded the easement to the United 
States in 1962, the easement language was expanded such that the District claimed the 
authority to convey to the United States the right "to construct and reconstruct, operate 
and maintain an underground pipeline and appurtenant structures, which latter may be 
situated above ground surface, on, over or across the following described property . . . ." 
(R. 48 & 49)(Add. 7)(emphasis added.) The underlined language and/or rights did not 
appear in the original deed. 
In 2006, the United States quitclaimed the SLA to the District in a five-page 
document. The District was purportedly given "all . . . interests in lands, facilities, 
equipment, improvements, fixtures, features and appurtenances that in any wise are part 
of or essential to the ownership, operation, or maintenance of the Aqueduct Division of 
the Provo River Project . . . ." (R. 43-47)(Add. 8.) The language in the 2006 deed 
exceeds the scope of rights granted by both the original easement and the 1962 easement. 
Based on the 2006 quitclaim deed, the District formulated 11 pages of regulations 
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restricting ho w homeowners can use and improve their property within the easement 
) 
At
 e v e ry turr i5 ^ i e District has broadened its alleged authority o\er LK SLA. . _ 
once was a simple one page grant of power to "construct, reconstruct, operate and 
iiiiimtiim" Li pipeline has beauiie I I pa^cs ol restrictions .iiul IniJiUtiiorb I he Dir.tni I1 , 
rights today cannot be any greater than the ngiiia ii vvao &ivcn inr^.i^h the original 
easement. The original easement in no uu j •ntemplated o\ hiJudeci IK I ;• _ > of 
rules the District is now imposing. :,;. i, .... ...*;,.:. A\.-, JA . , ..,::.ss 
language of the easement and thi is the D ' " • ' *~ a*zx v^ • 
Sorf has never agreed to the scope of easemem claimed >> the Disiru : ! IK -ern^ 
of the District's authority in relation to Sorf s property arc
 t\i u: ^ pi^e. 1- \ e • in. v_ >cf 
does hold an easement dominant to Sorf s es* * . . » ' • - • • * •• * 
to impose any restriction or regulation that ;l Jcoiivo. Utah law i^  clear mat u^ ot ^n 
easement must be as reasonable and minimally burdensome as the easement will permit. "It is 
^•-vier* estate •»> the rprj/ - the easerruT/ and IN PIITH-^- v\; . permit" ih^ Con -MVUU 
7 anner Ilf/c/i G ). v Mo> le, • • a;i 213, 233 (I Jtah 19" 1 6). It is the language of an easement 
that controls and rights and relationship of a landowner and easement holder. In this case, the 
easement language is limited to a "perpetual easement to construct, reconstruct, operate and 
.'" (R. 39)(Add. 6.) When that language Is contrasted against the case law cited by the 
T\;iricL it quickly becomes evident that the cited case law is neither controlling nor 
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persuasive. The easement language in the cited case law is substantially broader and 
fundamentally different from the easement language in this case. 
In Mid-America Pipeline Co. v. Lario Enterprise, Inc., 942 F.2d 1519, 1522 (10th 
Cir. 1991), the easement stated: 
Grantee shall have the right to clear and keep clear all trees, undergrowth and 
other obstructions from the herein granted right of way, and Grantor agrees not to 
build, construct or create, nor permit others to build, construct or create any 
buildings or other structures on the herein granted right of way that will interfere 
with the normal operation and maintenance of the said line or lines. (Emphasis 
added.) 
In Mississippi River Transmission Corp. v. Wachter Const., Inc., 731 S.W.2d445, 
446 (Miss. App. 1987), the easement provided the grantee the right to control: 
. . . the right of ingress and egress to and from the said right of way and to 
and from the said line or lines, or other equipment, or any of them, for the 
purpose aforesaid. (Emphasis added.) 
In Banyan Const. Co., Inc. v. Union Elec. Co., 840 S.W.2d 298, 301 (Ms. App. 
1992), the easement stated: 
. . . the perpetual right, . . . in Grantee to survey, stake, construct, 
reconstruct, erect, place, keep, operate, maintain, inspect, patrol, add to the 
number of and relocate at will, at any time, and from time to time, in, on, 
upon, along, over, through, across, and under the herein described easement 
a line or lines of towers, poles, conduits, and appurtenances, crossarms, ( 
wires, cables, transformers, anchors, guy wires, foundations, footings, and 
other appurtenances . . . . The grantor agrees that it will not erect any 
building or structure or create or permit any hazard or obstruction of any 
kind or character which, in the judgment of Grantee, will interfere with . . . 
Grantee's facilities. (Emphasis added.) 
Lastly, in Cox v. East Tenn. Nat. Gas Co., 136 S.W.3d 626, 627 (Tenn. App. 
2003), the easement provided the Grantee: 
a perpetual right of way and easement . . . the Grantee shall have the right 
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from time to time to cut and keep clear all trees, undergrowth and other 
obstructions on said right of way and easement that may injure, endanger or 
interfere with the use of said pipe line or pipe lines (Emphasis added,) 
No where in the original easement granted to the District is there an) language by 
which the District was r:"en the authority to preclude building on the easement, to 
pipeline or to otherwise control the right of ingress and egress. The easement language In 
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assertion, Sorf is no longer free to enjoy his backyard like he did in the past, 
feet from the center of die oipeline, that does little for Sorf because the easement 
consumes the majority of his proper! \ (See Picture "I of y\ \ n Supplemental 
Record)^ Uld 9.) I he SI < v p.,:,.;... ,-. ... . * .„•/.. 
easen v • •• • , ^ i
 iLaji ui me backyard, me 
easement that extends to the east nrihc pipeline encompasses all but a MTVT -omei if the 
second na.t > u^ back} aid. ihc iav.i .•;>,:, S. . can n^e the southeast comer v\ ..^ wii\; 
oiilsidi" Ihr - ion ol ihr 1 )istricl in no u ,« 
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The existence of Bureau of Reclamation land-use directives in no way justify or 
authorize the District's current regulations. The federal authority cited by the District 
went into effect after Sorf s home was erected. Specifically, 43 CFR 429.7 was enacted 
in 1983 and the Reclamation Manual was created in 2002. Sorf s home was built in 
1971. Accordingly, the home had been in existence, and sitting on the SLA easement, for 
many years before any federal authority was enacted demanding encroachment licenses. 
The existence of Sorf s home, along with the rest of his neighborhood that sits on the 
SLA easement, is clear evidence that encroachment licenses have not been historically 
required. Sorf s home, created for exclusive private use, was allowed to be built on the 
SLA easement without an encroachment license. At no time while holding the SLA 
easement did the Bureau of Reclamation demand an encroachment license be obtained 
for the continued existence of Sorf s home or development of his backyard. It was not 
until 2009, 39 years after Sorf s home was built and 21 years after Sorf purchased the 
property, that he was advised by the District that submission of an application was 
necessary in order to make improvements to the SLA easement. (Dec. of Z. Sorf at f 11 
(R. 304)(Add. 4).) The regulations and restrictions being imposed by the District do in 
fact present a new and never before seen regulatory environment. 
Mr. Sorf s occupation of the SLA is not trespass per se. The facts in Gallegos v. 
Lloyd, 2008 UT App 40, are significantly different from this matter and thus, the case is 
clearly distinguishable. In Gallegos, James and Julie Lloyd built their home on property 
that belonged to Andrew and Joan Gallegos. In turn, the Gallegos' filed a complaint for 
trespass, negligence and quiet title. In discussing the standards for awarding damages on 
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a trespass claim, the court referenced the Restatement of huts IliaL v\a\ uted k lit..1 
Di'itrk'i " - ' Ii r il lUr liiblt" lint* n Irespass mi III.mull under the rule stated in 
Restatement ^ ; vS, it is necessary only that the actor intentional 1> be upon ;ii;; part ,-f [he 
land in quests: ,"N The fundamental difference between ii c 1 ioyd^ .iv:ions and the 
actions of Sort is that the 1 loyds lunll improvement, "ii pt"npeti\ ih.it i.inI ii Ixlmiy in 
them \ vhile Sorf ii npro'i ed propert) that he purchased and owns. It is ridiculous to 
suggest Sorf is trespassing in his own backyard. 
b. Sorfs Adverse Possession Defense is Meritorious. 
Sorf s ad\ erse po- - • - { ' - ^ *• " :-. 1 nc District has incorrectly 
characterized this issue, i'he Dislrici is misleading the Coi.r; i suggesting that only 
"governmental property" is at issue, Such is not the case. In 1988,, Sorf purchased the 
home at the si lbjec t addi ess Sine e that time, Soi f has • :: ecu ipied maintained and 
imprc -r! ^n^.-^y that he ; nialK Dvvib. 
The ciiations referenced »-: ihe District dr ivt support its arguments. First, Utah 
Code Ann § 78B-2 -216 does not apply because that s tatute concerns ad;v erse possession 
* . ' . ^ • * v. ihia cdbc concerns neither a public street 
iA,r propert} held bj u U'wn. eit\ o- uMir i\ ^eeo* d \n . Ji ir. 2d § 268 and the cited 
I Jtah case h:^ uoes not apply because those matters concern go v ei nmental land being 
held i ii a pub 1 ic ti i ist I he District has admitted that the easement was not placed into a 
public trust until 2006. B} that tune, Scr^ hau ucci:pied. maintained an*1, "mproved the 
easement area for IS >ears adverse to the interests *•! ::ic Di-me; ana ..- redecessors. 
^iinei .. J ' i u i i ' - i - - • •• ' "'"s actions 
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during that time. The 18 years of adverse use by Sorf coupled with the easement holder's 
non-use of the portion of the easement not occupied by the SLA pipeline evidenced an 
intent to abandon and resulted in termination of the easement. 
c. The Easement Has Been at Least Partially Abandoned by the 
District. 
Sorf has not argued that the District abandoned the easement where the SLA 
pipeline actually runs. However, it is Sorf s position that the District has abandoned the 
portion of the easement that is not directly occupied by the pipeline. In his opening brief, 
Sorf cited to hunt v. Lance, 2008 UT App. 192. The District did not distinguish Lunt in 
any way. In Lunt, the Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court's decision that there was a 
partial abandonment of an easement because a portion of the easement had not been used 
within the past twenty years, a gate had been constructed blocking that portion of the 
easement from being used, and Lunt had acquiesced in the closure by never taking any 
action to object. Id. at fflf 27-29. The court held that a "history of non-use, coupled with 
an act or omission showing a clear intent to abandon" is sufficient to show abandonment. 
Id. at TJ25. The Lunt decision supports Sorf s arguments. 
Just like in Lunt, the inactivity of the District and its predecessors for the past 
several decades constitutes an abandonment. The District admitted that enforcement of 
the easement was "admittedly lax." (Brief of Appellee at p. 5.) In all actuality, 
enforcement was not just "lax" but has been non-existent. Between 1946 and 2009, 
homes, patios, sheds, trees, swimming pools, tennis courts, neighborhood streets, etc. 
were allowed to be erected on the easement. Now suddenly, without there being any 
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i * • me in the easement language, the District is claiming that homeowners cannot have 
any physical struc t ures on the easement and that the D Lsti let can rest rict all impro \ • ements 
V:C....... ,.... ':'strict's right to restrict surface improvements was 
: :,idi i:cu b- inc macth ; <•: ihc last six decade^ in permitting pcmu;r>j';: * •!.. 
structures to - . .-uni on the easement. As sa^h. mere i>> a strong iikvmnwoc :...ii principals 
c f abandonme tit ^ vould 11 reritorioi lsly defend against the District's allegations. 
d. Equitable Estoppel Would Meritoriously Defend Against the 
District }s Allegations. 
Sorf asserted a meritorious defense for equitable estoppel. Finding Sorf s 
Pll'iiilable esti'piM'l .tijuinnn'h inn I'O1 MII- ^miM1 «1 <• 1 mlf in mi unprecedented expansion 
oi Utah law. The caution exercised in applying equitable estoppel to a governmental 
entity exists only when the entity is "functioning in a governmental, as opposed to a 
p i - - M - - . ' • : • • . , : . * • 
App. 1990). ii muol be remembered that when me State functions in ;L> pr.>r-:cnm 
capacity, it will receive no better treatment than an> tw 0 prrv ate Individuals who bring 
their dispute before the coin ts for final resoli ition ' I c i'„ (citation oniitted ) I he Utah 
Supreme Court has held that the furnishing of water to inhabitants is a proprietary 
function. "Where a municipality is engaged in supplying water to its inhabitants, it acts 
In its business or proprietary; rame; man us governmental, capacity." Home Ch\ me? s' 
acting to "provide retail public water sendee" to \ arious areas of Salt Lake County. 
(Complaint at ^ 5 (R 6)(Add, 5)(emphasis added ) Such actions are a proprietary 
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function. Accordingly, the District is not entitled to any specific protections and it is 
subject to the principals of equitable estoppel without reservation or restriction. 
Despite the District's suggestions otherwise, when establishing grounds for 
equitable estoppel, there is no requirement that verbal statements by a governmental 
official be corroborated by a written document. The elements of equitable estoppel are: 
(1) a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party inconsistent 
with a claim later asserted; (2) reasonable action or inaction by the other < 
party taken on the basis of the first party's statement, admission, act, or 
failure to act; and (3) injury to the second party that would result from 
allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such statement, admission, 
act, or failure to act. 
Eldredge, 795 P.2d at 675. The first element requires only that "a statement, admission, 
act, or failure" be inconsistent with a claim later asserted. Id. The first element says 
nothing to suggest that the statement cannot be verbal or that the statement must be made 
in writing. The District has cited no authority to support its assertion that a statement or 
admission serving as the basis for an equitable estoppel claim must be written and/or 
supported by corroborating documents. 
The McLeod v. Retirement Bd, 257 P.3d 1090 (Utah App. 2011) decision cited by 
i 
the District does not apply to this case and thus, must be disregarded. In McLeod, Kevin 
McLeod asserted claims of equitable estoppel against the Utah State Retirement System. 
McLeod claimed that employees of the Retirement System made verbal statements that 
he relied upon in deciding to retire from the Davis County Sheriffs Office. During its 
dealings with McLeod, the Utah State Retirement System was acting in a governmental 
capacity. Accordingly, equitable estoppel was applied with a high degree of caution. In 
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this case, as explained aou^. mc L^ i.^ -^t^ i i^  acting m a proprietary capacity As such, the 
The McLeod decision has no bearing on the dispute between Sorf and the District. 
Sorf s arguments concerning the development of other properties affected by the 
permitted on other properties substantiate the reasonableness of Sorf s reliance on 
conversation-, with District employees. On tv. ;eas: ;wo occasions, District employees 
told Sort ui,; • -,., lahdscuj/i/ig was appropriate. 1 here was no reason tor :;. ; u. question 
and improvements seen around Sorf s neighborhood. (See Pictures 7 & 8 of 
c




 ^perliea impacted b> me SLA cascmcni is iiui ucing asserted for th^ iirsi amc on 
appeal. In Sorf s Supplemental Declaration filed as an exhibit to his Reply Memorandum 
..Vp'''' ; ' i. * - iv*s. • o, . : \ . , , \ i . ... . , .^v . ai. . . ; ":c:ei'x. pads. 
driveway '" - = :P\^ •: .- , T , ! : ! ! . -M-- l:-. A • -^ < 
j
 d objects over the SLA casement" n nis neighborhood and explained *. i: "u M -
those observations'" he belie\ ed he could improve his back} ard as long as he did not 
Hie District claims that employee statements cannot be considered in conjunction 
with Sorf s equitable estoppel defense because such statements would divest assets held 
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historically accurate. The SLA easement was not put in to a public trust until 2006. The 
SLA easement existed for 60 years (i.e., 1946 to 2006) without ever being held in a trust. 
The District cannot abruptly choose to place long-standing property rights into a trust and 
then claim it is entitled to protections of that trust. The majority of Sorf s use and 
occupation of his property within the SLA easement took place long before the easement 
was held in a public trust. 
This case has critical financial and personal implication on Sorf. This is not a 
matter that should be decided without considering, analyzing and resolving the District's 
allegations on the merits. The trial court failed to made adequate findings of fact as to all 
of the Rule 60(b) reasons proffered by Sorf and failed to consider Sorf s multiple 
meritorious defenses. Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion when it denied 
Sorf s Motion to Set Aside. The trial court's decision must be reversed. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING SORTS MOTION 
FOR LEAVE TO FILE A COUNTERCLAIM. 
The District has recognized and admitted that Sorf has a legitimate takings claim. 
"Sorf s regulatory taking claim ripened when [the District] took action to enforce its 
regulatory rights under the easement." (Brief of Appellee at p. 37)(emphasis added.) 
Despite that recognition, the District is urging this Court to trap Sorf with procedural 
technicalities such that he loses his claim. On one hand, the District is arguing that Sorf 
lost his taking claim because the District filed its Complaint first and Sorf s claim was 
compulsory to those addressed in the default. On the other hand, the District is arguing 
that the Motion for Leave was procedurally improper and thus, not an available 
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alternative. ' he Di s ir) c i i -i us 111 u u i c L v * u it's r ules as bom a sihv-iu . . a a sword, I he way 
holding a legitimate and redressable claim. 
It would be unjust:, illogical and unconstitutional for Sorf to lose his taking claim 
simply because the District got to tl le ecu u thouse first and forti iitousl> obtained a default 
judgment It is 1 lie District's position that Sorf s taking claim arose when the stop-work 
order v:i> affixed i.^  hi> nronem in \ugust 2f '~- T-. : ; : 'V * uer. ii ^viurer 2010, 
liu. ;;.>;;KI .-... ;^  v wiiipiaiiit. u.*. wj^iiicl ^ arguing tl:u. .>* *. ^ ia,w ... ^.^;^ was 
serve a pleading and default wras entered. The District's arguments should be disregarded 
because they have already been considered ind IcgaVy rejected. T~ Lavr^r v Wassad, 
6611 F Su] >P 2( I 55 ( D ]\ fc i: ss 2009), I BJ I • , = . .:\ 
a real estate dispute. Laverty did not answer the complaint or otherwise appear and thus, 
default was entered against him. Laverty moved to vacate the default and his motion was 
denie- . / .. , . ; . j . ;i_ . . ...rnpiamt again>>\ w\ .-;;: u:_;it^ ..:». , :::puiL . . 
be disiiiisseu br vi-^ i4 ^ *" / . v*. v uiuii thai had been lual wiui inc 
default judgmen ! he court rejected 1 BM's argument. 
As notec. LLJM Draught an action :or breach of contract in the Superior 
Court, and was awarded a default judgment against Laverty. At first blush, 
the application of Mass. R. Civ. P. 13(a) to the default judgment would 
appear to preclude plaintiffs claims against LBM. However, Rule 13(a) 
specifically says that a "pleading shall state as a counterclaim" those claims 
that arise out of the same 'transaction or occurrence' that was the subject 
matter of the prior suit (emphasis added.) Plaintiff ne\er filed a pleading in 
the Superior Court. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments j 22, comment 
e, Illustration e; see IDA Wright & Miller, Federal Practice :::rvi °rDcedures 
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< 
§ 2682 ("a defendant who fails to appear or to file a responsive pleading 
and against whom a judgment is entered under Rule 55(b) should not be 
prevented from asserting a claim in a later action that would have been a 
compulsory counterclaim in the action that terminated by default 
judgment"); see also Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 22, Reporter's 
Notes ("the compulsory counterclaim rule does not apply with respect to a 
default judgment entered before the filing of a responsive pleading"), citing 
10A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedures § 2682. Rule 13(a) 
is therefore inapplicable. 
Laverty, 661 F. Supp. 2d. at 63 & 64 (italics in original, underline added.) The 
{ 
requirements of Rule 13(a) only come into effect after a pleading has been served. It is 
the District's position that Sorf has never served a pleading in this matter and thus, it 
cannot rely upon or seek to enforce Rule 13(a) against Sorf. 
With regard to the Motion for Leave to File an After-Acquired Counterclaim, the 
District is attempting to whipsaw Sorf from both sides. The District argues that the 
Motion for Leave was improper because the default was final and thus, Sorf needed to 
reopen the judgment. In the next breath, the District argues that the default is not final 
because it is on appeal. Simply put, the District cannot have it both ways. When his 
Motion to Set Aside was denied, Sorf was left holding a valid takings claim. As such, 
Sorf took reasonable steps to ask the trial court for an opportunity to assert his claim.
 ( 
Sorf s Motion for Leave was appropriate because he had already attempted to reopen the 
default judgment by filing the Motion to Set Aside. 
When Sorf used the term "finalized" in his initial brief, he was referring to the act 
of the trial court upholding the default judgment. Until it was clear that the default was 
going to remain in effect, the right and authorities of the District over Sorf s property 
were up in the air. In the event the trial court set the default aside, the parties would have 
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gone back to the terms of the Complaint, including the District's request for the court to 
declare its rights and authorities over Sorf s property. In that situation, the restrictions 
and regulations on Sorf s property would have been put on hold and there would be no 
taking. It was the denial of the Motion to Set Aside that defined how Sorf s property 
could and could not be used and thus, it was that event that triggered the ripening of 
Sorf s taking claim. 
The case law cited in Sorf s initial brief does in fact support his argument 
concerning when his takings claim ripened. The District has attempted to distinguish 
Droste v. Board of County Commissioners, 85 P.3d 585 (Colo. App. 1993), on the 
grounds that claims were still pending before the trial court when the appeal in Droste 
ensued. The procedural formalities of why only a partial final judgment was rendered in 
Droste are not of great significance. What is important is the court's reasoning behind its 
decision. The court held that Drostes' inverse condemnation claim was not ripe because 
"a final determination on that claim ha[d] not been made." Id. at 591. The same situation 
exists in this matter. The District's attempts to impose regulations on Sorf did not 
constitute a final decision. The District simply told Sorf that the regulations applied but 
then asked the trial court to make a determination as to whether the regulations were 
appropriate and whether the District even had the authority to promulgate regulations. 
Until the default judgment was upheld with the denial of the Motion to Set Aside, no 
final determination had been made as to the District's rights over Sorf s property. 
In relation to Williams v. City of Central, 907 P.2d 701 (Colo. App. 1995), the 
District again focused on immaterial facts in attempts to distinguish relevant case law. 
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Despite the District's assertions, it was not the length of the moratorium or the absence of 
a permit denial that led the court to conclude plaintiffs inverse condemnation claim was 
not ripe. Rather, just like in Droste, the holding was based on the absence of a final 
determination as to application of the governmental regulation to the plaintiffs property. 
A claim for inverse condemnation alleging that the government has 
executed a permanent regulatory taking is not ripe until a final 
decision has been made as to the uses to which the property may be 
put. Wilkinson v. Board of County Commissioners, 872 P.2d 1269 (Colo. \ 
App. 1993); Reale Investments, Inc. v. City of Colorado Springs, 856 P.2d 
91, 94 (Colo. App. 1993) (a "court cannot determine whether a 
regulation has gone 'too far' unless it knows how far the regulation 
goes"). 
Id. at 708 (emphasis added.) 
The District's reliance on Reale Investments, Inc. v. City of Colorado Springs, 856 
P.2d 91 (Colo. App. 1993) is unfounded. The decision in Reale actually supports Sorf s 
arguments. Just like in Droste and Williams, the critical factor in Reale for determining 
ripeness was the existence of a final determination. "A court cannot determine whether a 
regulation has gone 'too far' unless it knows how far the regulation goes. That effect 
cannot be measured until a final decision is made as to how the regulations will be 
applied to the property in question." Id. at 94 (citation omitted.) In Reale, the city 
planning commission had full authority to review and deny Reale's zoning application. 
However, the commission did not have an opportunity to exercise its power because 
Reale withdrew his zoning request. Accordingly, no final decision was made concerning 
application of the regulations to Reale's property. In this case, the District lacked 
confidence in its authority to issue a final decision concerning application of its 
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regulations to Sorf s property and thus, asked the trial court to do so. Reale does not 
stand for the proposition that a final determination has to be made by the governmental 
entity. Rather, Reale simply holds that a taking claim is ripe when a final decision has 
been made. In this case, the District asked the trial court to make such a determination. 
No final determination was reached until the default judgment was upheld with the denial 
of Sorf s Motion to Set Aside. Raising an inverse condemnation claim prior to 
fmalization of the default judgment would have been premature. 
The District is trying to convince the Court that unless Sorf has been denied all 
economically beneficial use of his property he cannot suffer a taking. The District's 
representation is incorrect. A taking exists when a "regulation goes too far" and can be 
found even if the regulation falls short of eliminating all economically beneficial uses of 
the property. Arnell v. Salt Lake County Bd of Adjustment, 112 P.3d 1214, 1220 (Utah 
App. 2005) (abrogated on other issues). 
Even if a regulation falls short of eliminating all economically beneficial 
use of land, an analysis of a complex of factors indicates whether the 
interference is so great that a virtual taking has nonetheless occurred. The 
factors include the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and 
particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct 
investment-backed expectations . . . [and] the character of the governmental 
action. 
Id. at 1220 & 1221. 
The facts of this case clearly show Sorf has in fact suffered a taking. When Sorf 
purchased his property in 1988, no restrictions or regulations were being enforced in 
conjunction with the easement. Accordingly, Sorf purchased a home that he reasonably 
believed could be utilized to his liking and that would be a sound financial investment. 
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Two decades later, the District suddenly formulated 11 pages of regulations concerning 
how Sorf s property can, and more importantly, cannot be used. {See Add. 10.) Sorf s 
ability to sell his home has been dramatically diminished, if not completely destroyed, as 
a result of the default judgment. No reasonable buyer would purchase a home that is 
subject to the extreme use regulations imposed by the default judgment. To the extent 
Sorf is no longer able to sell his home, he has suffered a total taking. To the extent he 
would be forced to sell his home at a significantly reduced price would create a virtual 
taking based on distinct investment-backed expectations. 
Even if this Court concludes that the default judgment was not the result of 
mistake, surprise, inadvertence or excusable neglect, the Court should not be comfortable 
with upholding the trial court's decisions. To do so would create a new law whereby a 
party could get trampled on by the government, and not obtain redress, simply because 
default was entered on earlier issues. Such a holding would have dramatic ramifications 
not only on takings law, but any type of legal matter where default is a possibility. It is a 
basic principle of jurisprudence that every case should be heard on its merits. As such, 
Sorf should be afforded an opportunity to assert his taking claim. The trial court's denial 
of Sorf s Motion for Leave was an abuse of discretion and must be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Sorf respectfully requests that the decisions of the 
trial court denying his Motion to Set Aside and Motion for Leave be reversed. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
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OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
[PROPOSED] ORDER DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION T.Q SET 
ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
Civil No.: 100921*025 
Judge Fratto 
The defendant Zdenek Sorf objects to the Plaintiffs [Proposed] Order, Denying 
Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment for the following reasons: 
1. The Court misapprehended the factual basis and showing of mistake, 
inadvertence and excusable neglect under Rule 60(b) URCP as it applies to the position of 
defendant on his motion. A finding that defendant was properly served did not preclude and 
override defendant's argument of mistake, inadvertence and excusable neglect relative to his 
v,ML£D 
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understanding that the letter of October 28, 2010 was soliciting discussions for resolution of the 
matter. 
The Court was in error in applying the legal standard it indicated to defendant's 
argument. 
The Court abused its discretion in refusing to set aside the default on defendant's 
argument of mistake, inadvertence and excusable neglect. 
The Court erred in its legal interpretation and relationship of legal determination 
with the facts argued by the defendant relative to defendant's defenses and the Court's 
determination that the same were not meritorious. 
The Court's stated basis for its rulings are inadequate under the facts presented by 
the defendant and an error in legal standards have been applied. 
DATED this/, ) day of March, 2011. 
STRONG # ^ 5 J N N I 
fasiA'4M/ 
*aul M. Belnap 
Bradley Wm. Bowen 
Casey W. Jones 
Attorneys for ZdenekSorf 
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don't think that — or maybe is minor -- in the great 
scheme of things, a minor -- a bit of dirt and a bit 
of rock and so forth. 
But I don't know that I take that into 
account. I take into account the character of what 
is the judgment, and what will happen here is, if 
this judgment is executed upon, that means the 
bulldozers go in and make some — not anything that 
can't be restored, but something that's permanent, 
and I think that's the Johnson case, the — yes, I 
suppose you could restore your law practice, but the 
fact of the matter is, if you're shut down, your 
practice comes to an end, and the effects of that can 
be permanent, even in the long haul, but it's 
certainly permanent in the short run. 
And then I -- and so I think the statutory 
scheme is this: In a civil action, if you post a 
supersedeas bond, the judgment is stayed, and the 
only question is what the amount of the supersedeas 
bond should be. That is my discretion, as to what 
the amount of the supersedeas bond should be. 
In this case I take into account the fact 
that this is a default judgment. I did, as part of 
Mr. Belnap's motion to reconsider this, opine in 
terms of the — whether there was a meritorious 
RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR 
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defense presented, and there's a distinction here 
between a meritorious defense presented at the time 
of the motion. That's the only time I can judge it, 
in relation to the motion, and whether there is 
ultimately a meritorious defense. 
But, in any event, I did not opine that 
what was offered were frivolous defenses, so we have 
a default judgment in which the merits of the matter 
have not been determined, and I cannot find that what 
has been raised as defenses are frivolous, and it 
seems to me that, as I say, that the execution on the 
judgment results in permanent -- a permanent 
situation. 
And then I suppose the fifth element that 
I'm looking at here is that the amount suggested, and 
by your own admission, is really just pulled out of 
the air, what would reflect your damages cannot be 
reduced to a dollar amount, I mean, in terms --
MR. DRANEY: In large part, that's true. 
THE COURT: -- of if there is a stay. And, 
in fact, the damages are quite speculative, in any 
event, that I'll have to go in -- that this 
cooperation, in the event that we have to go in, will 
not be there and so forth is very, very speculative, 
really, on all sides. 
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If anything, Mr. Belnap -- Mr. Sorf, 
through Mr. Belnap, has expressed a desire to 
cooperate, and -- but, in any event, it seems to me, 
as I say, that itfs a permanent thing. 
On the other hand, the rule, it seems to 
me, does not give discretion as to whether there 
should be no supersedeas bond, but there has to be 
some supersedeas bond, and my only task here is to 
determine what the amount is, not whether there 
should be any. That was my question, as to whether 
there's anything else in our rules or authority that 
said in a civil matter you can stay a judgment. 
And so it seems to me, in short -- Ifm 
trying to be as clear as I can -- that if you post a 
supersedeas bond, the judgment is stayed. The amount 
of the bond is to be determined by me. I take into 
account, in determining what the amount is, the 
factors I've already outlined. It's a default 
judgment. There's been no determination on the 
issues. I have not found the defenses -- what's been 
raised here is frivolous or that the appeal is --
would be engaged in for dilatory reasons for improper 
purposes, and it seems to me that if the judgment is 
permitted to be executed upon, that it results in a 
permanent situation rather than -- although possibly 
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cases. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Belnap. 
MR. BELNAP: Thank you very much. Can I 
take that paper from you? 
THE COURT: Yes. Now, I appreciate 
everyone's presentation. I'm prepared to make a 
decision. 
The matter is in front of me as a motion to 
set aside the default judgment. It's a Rule 60(b) 
motion, pled as a 60(b) motion. It has two prongs to 
the analysis. 
The first is that there must be, in this 
case, it appears to me, invoked the excusable 
neglect. I should set aside the judgment as a result 
of excusable neglect. That, of course, has two 
parts. Number one, that there was neglect, and 
number two, that the neglect was excusable. 
And then, once having found that, excusable 
neglect, let me proceed to what is the second factor 
to consider, and that is whether there is a 
meritorious defense. Not whether there is a 
prevailing defense, but whether there's a meritorious 
defense. And the reason for that, of course, is 
that -- no need to set aside the judgment if we'll be 
back — we'll be back to the same spot because 
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there's really no meritorious defense presented. 
But those are two separate prongs. The 
first prong must be considered first, and, depending 
on that decision, lead into the second prong, 
excusable neglect. 
What's been offered here as excusable 
neglect is that, it seems to me, is fairly 
characterized as Mr. Sorf was not aware of the 
complaint in the first instance, and then in the 
second instance, that he was led to believe that the 
posture of the matter was discussion, negotiation --
well, negotiation, discussion, and so forth. 
The undisputed facts appear to be this, and 
that is that the rule provides that one is properly 
and personally served if you serve the complaint at 
the residence of the defendant and upon a person 
residing at that residence over the age of 18. "A 
suitable age" maybe is the rule, rather than 18, but 
"a suitable age." 
The undisputed facts here appear to be that 
the complaint was served at the residence of 
Mr. Sorf, and although the person was characterized 
as his wife, representing as "my wife," that, in 
fact, every inference here in terms of that there was 
a person, a female, maybe more correctly 
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characterized as his girlfriend, who was residing at 
the residence -- and there's nothing to suggest that 
yet a different female was served. That doesn't 
really seem to be in dispute. And so the rule here 
seems to be complied with, the rule in terms of 
perfecting service, that is, at the -- Mr. Sorfs 
residence, upon a female residing, and a suitable 
age . 
Now, what's offered here in terms of 
excusable neglect is that Mr. Sorf was not aware of 
that service, I guess inferred here that the 
girlfriend, a female resident, did not advise 
Mr. Sorf of that service. 
Now, I have some discretion here, but I 
think I have a lot of guidance in terms of what is 
excusable neglect that would guide me as to what 
would be the appropriate exercise of that discretion. 
It appears to me that the law is fairly clear that, 
"You've actually served it on someone else who didn't 
advise me they had been served" is not excusable 
neglect. If, in fact, it was excusable neglect, then 
it seems to me the rule would accommodate that very 
real possibility, that someone else is served and 
not -- and does not advise the other person in the 
household. 
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But the rule doesn't accommodate that. It 
provides that service is complete and perfected if 
that third person, if you will, who resides at the 
residence, has been served with papers. 
But I also note, in terms of factually, 
that apparently there was a notice of the intent to 
take the default --
MR. DRANEY: And the default and several 
other documents. 
THE COURT: -- that was sent, and there's 
no dispute that that had been sent in terms of the 
notice to take the default. 
MR. BELNAP: Your Honor, could you also 
address the mistake --
THE COURT: Yes. Let me finish, and then 
if there's some questions, I'll entertain a few of 
those, but I'm just trying to give you the reasons 
I'm going to rule as I'm ruling. 
As I say, I have this first prong. The 
second is the -- in terms of the service, that -- and 
with this letter and so forth, that somehow "I was 
misled as to the status of the matter, that I didn't 
have to answer the complaint because we were in 
serious negotiations and so forth," and, indeed, that 
would present a meritorious defense -- or not a 
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meritorious defense, but excusable neglect, that "I 
was misled as to the posture of having to respond to 
this complaint by what the plaintiff did in 
contacting me" and so forth. 
Well, without analyzing further in terms of 
the contact and the reason in terms -- that only is 
appropriate if I'm aware I have been served and my 
obligation to answer and that I have been misled, but 
apparently Mr. Sorf was not aware he had been served, 
so whether he thought the posture was just in a 
posture of negotiation over the lawsuit is not 
applicable here. 
In other words, you can't be dissuaded from 
answering the complaint by being misled by the other 
party when you're not aware there was even -- if 
there is even a complaint and a lawsuit. 
And so it seems to me that there's a 
failure to show that excusable -- that first prong, 
excusable neglect. And I suppose I could bring the 
analysis to a close with that, because without a 
showing of excusable neglect, then the matter cannot 
be set aside. The complaint cannot be set aside. 
However, there is that second prong, and 
that is whether there was a meritorious defense, and 
I want to address that, because I -- without really 
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too much, other than to say this, that -- as I say, a 
meritorious defense is not a prevailing defense, 
especially, but has some merit to it, but those 
offered, if you will, defenses -- that is, estoppel, 
the scope of the easement is too great and the --
everyone else is in jeopardy here around the 
valley -- are not defense in this instance that 
have -- that are meritorious. 
Estoppel does not appear to me to be 
applicable as a matter of law. In terms of the scope 
of the easement, indeed -- and maybe I use that word 
advisedly -- there may have been, because the -- some 
of the structures and some of the requirements here 
did not astride the pipe, and so, as a matter of law, 
we can say, "Well, there's some room for debate here 
as to how far this easement goes." 
But where you have a deed on this 
particular property that puts into metes and 
bounds -- and thatfs the only fair reading of that 
deed -- what the easement is, then I suppose the 
conclusion is, if that deed is applicable to that 
property, you build and you do things within that 
easement at your own risk, and it is not really a 
question of the analysis that one would go through 
with the dominant and the servient estate analysis, 
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and Mr. Belnap correctly points out in terms of the 
analysis you make but for that deed, and so, 
consequently, I don't see that there's a meritorious 
defense. 
For all those reasons, as I've tried to 
articulate, your motion to set aside this default 
judgment is respectfully denied. 
Mr. Draney, if you will prepare an order 
that reflects that. 
MR. DRANEY: I will, your Honor. 
MR. BELNAP: Your Honor --
THE COURT: Thank you for your 
presentations. 
MR. BELNAP: -- may I ask a question? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. BELNAP: And I understand your ruling, 
but the rule also speaks of mistake and inadvertence, 
which I understand your analysis of the letter, but 
the letter can certainly --
THE COURT: Well, Mr. Belnap, I'm going to 
stop you there. I appreciate the other -- and 
there's other factors in the rule, also, but it 
appears to me the only one that would be applicable 
in this instance and with what excuses have been 
given is excusable neglect, and, for the reasons I've 
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already stated, I do not see that there has been a 
showing here of excusable neglect. 
MR. BELNAP: Your Honor, could we talk 
about the next step here, and that is --
THE COURT: Ifm going to stop you there, 
because we're going to have to do that in another 
context. We've actually -- the next matter, I think, 
was scheduled, if I'm correct, at 3:30, and so we've 
gone well beyond that. I can only deal with what 
we've got here in front of me today. 
MR. BELNAP: Thank you. 
THE COURT: If you'll prepare that. 
MR. DRANEY: Yes. 
THE COURT: We appreciate everyone's — 
MR. DRANEY: Thank you for your time, your 
Honor 
(Hearing concluded at 4:06 p.m.) 
* * * * 
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Paul M. Belnap, #0279 
Bradley Wm. Bowen, #5042 
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Attorneys for Defendant Zdenek Sorf 
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SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT OF 





SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF 
ZDENEK SORF 
Civil No.: 1009211025 
Judge Fratto 
I, ZDENEK SORF, declare as follows: 
1. I am over the age of 18, a current resident of the State of Utah, and I am the 
Defendant in the above-captioned lawsuit. 
2. I have personal knowledge of my statements set forth herein. 
3. In 1988,1 purchased my home located at 9625 South Mount Jordan Road, Sandy, 
Utah and have resided there ever since. 
4. Several large trees, rocks and brush were located on the SLA easement in my 
backyard before I bought my property in 1988. 
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5. Two of the trees were at least 60 feet tall 
6. A small shed was also located on the easement prior to the time I purchased my 
home. 
7. Plaintiff Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake and Sandy ("Plaintiff') recently 
informed me that a corner of my house and concrete patio extending from the backdoor of my 
house are on the easement. 
8. For at least twenty years after I purchased my home, no one ever expressed any 
concern to me regarding the trees, rocks, patio, brush and shed being located on the SLA 
easement. 
9. During the nearly twenty-three years I have lived in my neighborhood, I have 
observed and continue to observe concrete pads, driveways, houses, large trees, cinder block 
walls, rock walls, sheds, and other structures and objects over the SLA easement. (See Exhibit 1 
which is a picture of my neighbor's basketball court which is directly over the pipeline; see also 
Exhibit 2 which is a picture of large tree, driveway and other large objects over the SLA 
easement across the street from Mr, Sorf s property; see also Exhibit 3 which is a picture of a 
stake, placed by Plaintiff, in front of the cinderblock wall identifying the Western edge of the 
easement. The picture demonstrates that Mr. Sorf s neighbor has large trees over the easement. 
The cinderblock wall, which is directly over the easement, has three foot cement foundations; see 
also Exhibit 4 which is a picture of a stake, placed by Plaintiff, identifying the Western edge of 
the easement. The picture shows that approximately 5 to 6 feet of my neighbor's house and 
foundation are on the SLA easement.) 
10. Based upon those observations, I believed that I could improve my backyard as 
long I did not interfere with the SLA pipeline. 
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11. I did not know that Plaintiff had regulations that required a landowner to submit 
an application in order make improvements over the SLA easement 
12. In approximately March 2009,1 began improving my backyard. 
13. I removed the large trees, rocks and brush from the easement and graded the dirt 
but did not bring new dirt onto my property. (Attached as Exhibit 5 is a picture of the tree stump 
from one of the trees I removed. The gazebo and hot tub are located directly where this tree was 
located.) 
14. Based upon instruction that was given by Plaintiffs representatives, I purposely 
did not place any structures directly over the pipeline. 
15. I located all structures and objects far enough away from the pipeline so as to not 
interfere with Plaintiffs right to maintain and operate the pipeline. 
16. The small storage shed was on the easement at the time I purchased the property 
and is approximately twenty-six (26) feet from the pipeline. 
17. I placed the Hot tub in the spot where I tore out one of the large trees. 
18. In addition, the Hot tub and gazebo are located approximately forty-eight (48) feet 
from the pipeline. 
19. The decorative rocks and other features on the easement are not cemented in and 
can be removed if necessary. 
20. The garden boxes for vegetables are located approximately thirty-one (31) feet 
from the pipeline and the water feature is approximately twenty-three (23) feet from the pipeline. 
21. In addition, another shed is not cemented into the ground and is located 
approximately forty-four (44) feet from the pipeline. 
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22. In November 2009, one of Plaintiffs employees visited me at my property. I 
believe his name was Lynn Coon. 
23. By this time, a majority of my landscaping was finished, except for a few items 
such as the rock sidewalk, grass, roof on the gazebo, fencing and a concrete pad in front of my 
second shed. 
24. Mr, Coon did not instruct me to cease landscaping or that I needed permission to 
continue. 
25. Instead, Mr. Coon told me that my landscaping should not interfere with the 
easement and suggested that I submit an application to Plaintiff indicating that I had improved 
my property for the purpose of updating their records. 
26. Mr. Coon showed me where he thought the easement boundaries on my property 
were and instructed me that I should not build or place any structures directly over where the 
pipeline was located, 
27. Mr. Coon told me that the location._of my second shed was not a problem because 
it was far enough away from the easement. However, he told me that two of my newly planted 
pine trees needed to be relocated. 
28. I told Mr. Coon that I could move the second shed if he thought it was on the 
easement but he said it was located far enough away from the center of the easement. 
29. In reliance upon Mr. Coon's affirmative representations, I poured a concrete patio 
around the second shed and finished the remainder of my landscaping project. 
30. I would have immediately stopped landscaping had Mr. Coon instructed me to 
cease landscaping or if he told me I was interfering with the SLA pipeline. 
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31. In May 2010, a second employee of Plaintiffs visited me at my property. I 
believe his name was Troy Simmons. 
32. Mr. Simmons did not inform me that any part of my landscaping was in violation 
of the SLA easement. 
33. However, Mr. Simmons suggested that I submit an application indicating that I 
had improved my property. 
34. Mr. Simmons did not request that I cease landscaping, 
35. I would have immediately stopped landscaping had Mr. Simmons instructed me to 
cease landscaping. 
36. Part of my landscaping project included replacing the old fences around my 
property with a new wood fence. 
37. A tall cinder block wall with three foot foundations existed on the North side of 
my property prior to the time I purchased my home approximately 23 years ago. {See Exhibit 6 
which is a picture of the cinder block wall after I cut into a portion of it and before I tore it 
completely down.) 
38. The cinder block wall did not contain a gate or otherwise permit access to that 
portion of the SLA easement on my property. 
39. I tore down the tall cinder block wall and its 3 foot foundations and installed the 
wood fence in its place. {See Exhibit 7 which is a picture of my wood fence abutting the old 
cinder block wall.) 
40. In compliance with Plaintiffs request, I installed an access gate on the North side 
of the fence in the location Plaintiff directed me to so that Plaintiff could have access to the 
portion of the SLA easement on my property. 
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41. I believe I am the only person in my neighborhood that has provided such access 
to Plaintiff. 
42. I have given Plaintiff a key to the lock on my access gate. 
43. Since I have lived in my home, I have never observed anyone performing any 
routine inspections of that portion of the easement which transverses across my property until I 
tore down part of the north cinder block wall along 94 South. 
44. In August 2010, Plaintiff requested for the first time that I stop work on my 
landscaping project. I was approximately two days from completing the project. 
45. I was never personally served with the summons and complaint nor had I seen a 
copy of the same until January 24,2011. 
. 46. I was not at home when the summons and complaint were purportedly served on 
October 28, 2010. 
47. I have not been married for over eight years. 
48. I do not know what happened to the summons and complaint that was purportedly 
served on October 28, 2010. 
49. I would have contacted a law firm immediately had I known I had been served 
with a complaint. 
50. I only received a letter dated October 28, 2010 which I thought had come in the 
mail for me without a complaint and summons enclosed, 
51. This letter led me to believe that Plaintiff wanted to reach an* amicable resolution 
and that is why I called Plaintiffs counsel on November 22, 2010. 
52. When I telephoned Plaintiffs counsel on November 22, 2010, I understood that 
Plaintiff would only initiate an action against me if I could not reach a settlement with Plaintiff 
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53. I am not an attorney and do not understand what it means to "enter a default 
certificate." 
54. I telephoned Mr. Winsor and Mr. Wilson on or about November 22, 2010 but I 
was unable to contact either of them. 
55. I have three numbers I could have called Mr. Winsor and Mr. Wilson from, 
including (801) 301-1160, (801) 531-9922 and (801) 521-4177. 
56. I have never been arrested or put in jail. 
57. Based upon my conversations with Murray City Court and Third District Court, 
there is not a warrant for my arrest. 
I DECLARE UNDER CRIMINAL PENALTY OF THE STATE OF UTAH THAT THE 
FOREGOING IS TRUE AND CORRECT. 
Executed this lp_ of February, 2011. 
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SHAWN H. DRANHY (4026) 
SCOTT H. MARTIN (7750) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801)521-9000 
Facsimile; (80l)?63-0400 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN 'THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
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) 
METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT ) 
ft OT SALT LAKE & SANDY, ) 
ty& ) VERIFIED COMPLAINT 
Plaintiff. ) 
) Civil No. 100^ Z \ 0 2 5 
XDKNEKSORF, ) Judge "prfffto 
) 
Defendant, ) 
Plaintiff, Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake & Sandy ("MWDSLS") alleges as 
follows: 
:';.:•••:'•' PARTIES, JURISDICTION.-AND VENUE 
1. MWDSLS is a Metropolitan Water District, a form of Local District, governed by 
Utah Code Ann.. Title 17B. Chapters 1 and 2a, particularly Title 17B. Chapter 2a, Pan 6. As 
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such, MWDSLS is an independent political subdivision of the State of Utah. MWDSLS' offices 
are located in Salt Lake County. 
2. Defendant is an individual residing in Sandy City. Salt Lake County. 
3. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78A-5-102, 78B-3-
205,and78B-6-401. 
4. Venue is proper pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-301 (1), as the real property 
that is the subject matter of this action is located in Salt Lake County. 
FACTS AND GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
MWDSLS and the SLA 
5. MWDSLS provides an on-demand, supplemental, wholesale, treated water supply 
to its member cities, Salt Lake City and Sandy City. The Public Utility Departments of 
MWDSLS member cities provide retail public water service to not only the residents and 
businesses within their respective city boundaries, but to other areas of Salt Lake County as well. 
For example, the Salt Lake City Public Utilities Department service area extends as far south as 
Sandy on the east side of Salt Lake Valley, with approximately 100,000 customers outside Salt 
Lake City, and approximately 100,000 customers inside Salt Lake City. 
6. MWDSLS also shares certain facilities with Jordan Valley Water Conservancy 
District ("JVWCD"), the other large water wholesaler that provides supplemental drinking water 
to most of the Salt Lake Valley not served by Salt Lake City Public Utilities or Sandy City 
Public Utilities. 
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7. One of the critical pieces of public water delivery mfrastructure in the Salt Lake 
Valley is the Salt Lake Aqueduct ("SLA"). 
8, The SLA was designed and constructed by the United Slates, Department of the 
Interior, Bureau of Reclamation ("Reclamation") as a division of the Provo River Project. The 
most prominent feature of the Deer Creek Division of the Provo River Project is the Deer Creek 
Dam and Reservoir at the head of Provo Canyon in Wasatch County. MWDSLS is by volume 
the largest user of Provo River Project water and the second largest user of Central Utah Project 
water stored in the Jordanelle and Deer Creek Reservoirs. 
9. The SLA is a mostly 69-inch inside diameter, mostly steel reinforced concrete, 
pipe, constructed beginning hi 1939 and completed in 1951. 
10, The capacity of the SLA is approximately 175 cubic feet per second (cfs). This 
equates to nearly 79,000 gallons per minute, and approximately 113 million gallons per day 
(GPD). At the peak demands of summer the SLA typically runs at maximum capacity. 
11, The SLA extends more than 41 miles from the toe of the Deer Creek Dam at the 
head of Provo Canyon, to a 40 million gallon finished water storage reservoir at approximately 
3300 South and 1-215 near the mouth of Parleys Canyon, 
12. The SLA carries untreated Provo River System water to the Little Cottonwood 
Water Treatment Plant ("LCWTP") at the end of Danish Road, Cottonwood Heights, Utah, near 
the mouth of Little Cottonwood Canyon. The SLA also seasonally serves untreated water to the 
JVWCD Southeast Regional Water Treatment Plant in Draper. 
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13. LCWTP treats Little Cottonwood Creek water in addition to water from the Provo 
River System. From LCWTP, the SLA carries treated (aka "finished") Provo River System and 
treated Little Cottonwood Creek water to a wide variety of places in Salt Lake County 
ultimately. 
14, The finished water portion of the SLA is tied to 3 other large aqueducts. The 
Point of the Mountain Aqueduct ("POMA") runs between the SLA at the LCWTP site, and the 
Point of the Mountain Water Treatment Plant ("POMWTP") in Draper. Near POMWTP, POMA 
connects to the 150th South Pipeline, which connects to the finished water portion of the Jordan 
Aqueduct ("JA"), a very large aqueduct that catries water on the west side of the valley. The raw 
water portion of JA takes water from the Provo River System to the Jordan Valley Water 
Treatment Plant ("JVWTP") in Herriman. 
15, The SLA, POMA, the 150lh South Pipeline and J A allow movement of water from 
the east side of the valley to the west side, and .from the west side of the valley to the east side. 
16. The SLA plays a critical role in the water supply for essentially the entire Salt 
Lake Valley. 
17: In 1938, MWDSLS contracted with Reclamation to repay to the United States all 
of the costs of constmcting the SLA, Under that 1938 Repayment Contract, MWDSLS was also 
obligated to operate, maintain, repair and replace the SLA. In return, MWDSLS received the 
exclusive use of the SLA. 
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18. The 2004 Provo River Project Transfer Act, Pub.Law 108-3 82, authorized the 
Secretary of the Interior to transfer the SLA to MWDSLS. As a result, MWDSLS now owns the 
SLA. 
19. The SLA is located within the SLA corridor. The SLA corridor consists of 
easement and fee lands now held by MWDSLS. 
20. While the SLA is mostly 60+ years old, it is in good condition. However, 
MWDSLS is making preliminary preparations for major rehabilitation work on the SLA in the 
next decades. 
21. The SLA is "open flow," which is to say it is not pressurized, and can be shut off 
only at the intake at the toe of the Deer Creek Dam. 
22. Routine access by MWDSLS staff to all parts of the SLA is critical to the care, 
operation, and maintenance of the SLA and the interests of the public. 
23. Unencumbered access to the entire width of the SLA corridor for emergency 
repairs is critical to the interests of the public. Construction of permanent structures on or 
overhanging the SLA corridor, without MWDSLS consent, is a violation of MWDSLS' real 
property interests. Planting or maintaining trees that may have to be removed for SLA 
emergency repairs, without MWDSLS consent, is a violation upon MWDSLS5 real property 
interests. 
24. Different segments of the SLA consist of different classes of pipe, intended for 
different maximum loads. Prevention of loads beyond design capacities, resulting from the 
addition of fill, structures, etc., is critical to the interests of the public. Placing fill, structures, or 
5 
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other materials on the SLA corridor, without MWDSLS consent, is a violation of MWDSLS' 
real property interests. 
25. Prior to transfer of title to the SLA and SLA corridor to MWDSLS, any 
development of the SLA corridor, even development by the holder of fee title subject to an SLA 
easement, required an encroachment agreement from Reclamation. 
26. Similarly, Utah Code Ann, §§ 17B-1-103 and 17B-1-301 grants MWDSLS the 
power to adopt and enforce regulations to protect the public infrastructure of MWDSLS. The 
MWDSLS Board of Trustees has promulgated regulations regarding the use of aqueduct 
corridors. A true and correct copy of those regulations is attached as Exhibit 1. 
Defendant's Property and the SLA corridor 
27. MWDSLS is informed and believes Defendant owns the property located at 9625 
South Mt. Jordan Road (at 2550 East) in Sandy, Utah ("Defendant's Property") depicted on the 
survey, attached as Exhibit 2. 
28. The SLA corridor crosses Defendant's Property as depicted on Exhibit 2, This 
portion of the SLA corridor that crosses Defendant's Property is referred to as Tract 417, a 
Reclamation designation. 
29. Reclamation formerly owned a perpetual easement on Tract 417 "to construct, 
reconstruct, operate and maintain" the SLA, including "appurtenant structures, which latter may 
be situated above ground surface " Originally this easement was acquired by MWDSLS 
(formerly known as the Metropolitan Water District of Sail Lake City). A true and correct copy 
of the Warranty Deed of Easement, recorded with the Salt Lake County Recorder February 8, 
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1946 as Entry No. 1028090, in Book 457, at Page 221 is attached as Exhibit 3. The easement 
was conveyed to the United States as a part of the original construction of the SLA. As a part of 
the SLA title transfer in 2006, the easement was conveyed by the United States back to 
MWDSLS, A true and correct copy of the relevant pages of the Quitclaim Deed (Salt Lake 
Aqueduct, Sail Lake County Lands), recorded with the Salt Lake County Recorder October 2, 
2006, as Entry No. 9862736, in Book 9359, at Pages 6770-6929 is attached hereto as Exhibit 4, 
30. On or about April 23, 2009, Defendant, either personally or through his contractor 
or agent, orally requested from MWDSLS authorization to construct a garage on Defendant's 
Propeity adjoining his home. 
31. In response to that request, on or about April 23,2009, MWDSLS personnel 
contacted and informed Defendant, either personally or through his contractor or agent, of the 
SLA, the SLA corridor, and the contact information for MWDSLS Aqueduct Inspectors, and that 
Defendant should request an on-site meeting to review the SLA location and Defendant's 
construction plans. 
32. Thereafter, neither Defendant nor his contactor or agent contacted MWDSLS. 
33. On or about November 19,2009, while on routine inspection of the SLA corridor, 
MWDSLS personnel encountered Defendant and spoke with him on-site at Defendant's 
Propeity. At this meeting, MWDSLS notified Defendant of MWDSLS regulations. Defendant 
was also provided with a MWDSLS standard form application for encroachment on the SLA 
corridor, and instructions for filing the same. 
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Defendant's Unauthorized Construction on the SLA corricJor 
3.4; Approximately six months later, on or about April 26, 2010, M WDSLS personnel 
observed construction work occurring at Defendant's Property on the SLA corridor. MWDSLS 
had not received the SLA corridor encroachment application from Defendant al that time. As 
such, MWDSLS personnel spoke to the contractor on site, and instructed him to cease work until 
the Defendant had obtained the required authorization from. MWDSLS. 
35. On May 25, 2010, during a follow up inspection of Defendant*s Property, 
MWDSLS personnel again found work being performed on the SLA corridor, including the 
construction of buildings, retaining walls, and water features, MWDSLS still had not received 
the SLA corridor encroachment application from Defendant at that time. The MWDSLS 
personnel spoke with Defendant reminding him of his non-compliance and the requirement that 
Defendant comply with MWDSLS procedures in making a formal application to undertake 
construction or other improvements on the SLA corridor. • 
36. Shortly after his meeting with the MWDSLS personnel at Defendant's Property, 
Defendant met with MWDSLS representatives at the MWDSLS offices, at which time 
MWDSLS personnel assisted Defendant in completing the MWDSLS encroachment application. 
37. Shortly thereafter, MWDSLS personnel met with Defendant at Defendant's 
Property assisting him with drawing his landscaping plans for attachment to his encroachment 
application. A true and correct copy of the Defendant's Application and drawing from a 2008 
aerial photograph is attached, as Kxhibit 5. 
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38. During this meeting at Defendant's Property, MWDSLS personnel informed 
Defendant that the water feature and the deck extension on the SLA corridor did not meet 
MWDSLS regulations and his encroachment application would likely be denied. 
39. At this same meeting, Defendant indicated to MWDSLS personnel thai it was his 
intention to install a gated fence across the SLA corridor but would provide for MWDSLS access 
to the SLA corridor. 
40. On June 21,2010, MWDSLS informed Defendant by letter that his MWDSLS 
encroachment application was denied ("Denial Letter"). A true and correct copy of the Denial 
Letter is attached as Exhibit 6. 
41. The reasons stated for MWDSLS's denial of Defendant's application included the 
following: 
(a) Buildings, foundations, footings, retaining walls, decks, decorative pools, 
ponds, or other water features are not allowed within the SLA corridor; 
(b) Non-compliance with cover depths above the SLA; and 
(c) No new trees or vines are allowed within the SLA corridor. 
42. The Denial Letter included a demand upon Defendant to remove or correct his 
landscaping and building encroachments within thirty (30) days. The Denial Letter also included 
instructions on procedures for appeal of the MWDSLS denial. 
43. On July 19, 2010, Defendant left a voice mail to MWDSLS personnel indicating 
that he had been out of town and would require an extension of time to file his appeal of the 
MWDSLS denial of his encroachment application. 
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44. On July 27,2010, M WDSLS sent a letter to Defendant granting him a thirty (30) 
day extension until August 26, 2010 to file his appeal ("Extension Letter"). A true and correct 
copy of the Extension Letter is attached as Exhibit 7. 
45. Despite repeated efforts to reach Defendant, MWDSLS has received no further 
correspondence from Defendant since his voicemail of July 19,2010. 
46. Based on inspections by MWDSLS personnel, Defendant's construction activities 
on the SLA corridor continued and the non-complaint structures had not been removed. 
47. On August 31,2010, the MWDSLS General Manager sent by certified mai I a 
letter to the Defendant again instructing him to cease all construction activity on the SLA 
corridor, to remove all improvements thereon, and to contact MWDSLS personnel within one 
week ('Third Notice Letter"), A true and correct copy of the Third Notice Letter is attached as 
Exhibit 8. 
48. In addition, on August 31,2010, a "Stop Work Notice" was posted at Defendant's 
Property on the SLA corridor. Photographs depicting the Stop Work Notice, the date, and its 
location are attached as Exhibit 9. 
49. On September 2,2010, MWDSLS personnel again visited the SLA corridor at 
Defendant's Property and found that the Stop Work Notice had been relocated from its installed 
location and Defendant's construction work on the SLA corridor was continuing. A photograph 
taken September 2, 2010 depicting this continuing construction is attached as Exhibit 10. 
50. On September 9, 2010, MWDSLS personnel again visited the SLA corridor at 
Defendant's Property and found Defendant's construction work had continued and a chain link 
10 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
fence had been erected, barring MWDSLS entry onto the SLA corridor. A photograph taken 
September 9, 2010 depictmg this condition is attached as Exhibit 11. 
51. On September 21,2010, MWDSLS personnel again visited the SLA corridor at 
Defendant's Property and found Defendant's construction work had continued with additional 
soil being brought in to the SLA corridor site, and a completed fence was erected with gate 
locked, fully preventing any access to the SLA corridor. The MWDSLS Stop Work Notice was 
nowhere to be seen. A photograph taken September 21, 2010 depicting this condition is attached 
as Exhibit 12. 
52. On September 22,2010, MWDSLS personnel again visited the SLA corridor at 
Defendant's Property and found Defendant's construction work had continued with additional 
soil being brought in to the SLA corridor site, the MWDSLS Stop Work Notice was nowhere to 
be seen, and the gate remained locked barring all access to the SLA corridor. A photograph from 
September 22,2010 depicting this condition is. attached as Exhibit 13. 
53. On or about October 11,2010, MWDSLS, for the first time, received a Blue 
Stakes request for fence installation at Defendant's Property. In response, MWDSLS installed a 
second Stop Work Notice on Defendant's Property. 
54. Defendants construction continues, no encroachment agreement has been reached, 
and the second Stop Work Notice has been removed from Defendant's Property by someone 
other than MWDSLS personnel. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION - MANDATORY INJUNCTION 
55. MWDSLS incorporates all previous paragraphs as though fully stated herein, 
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56. MWDSLS holds the dominant estate on Tract 417 of the SLA corridor, including 
that portion of Tract 417 which traverses Defendant's Property. 
57. MWDSLS *s property interests include rights of full enjoyment of a "perpetual 
easement" on Tract 417 to construct, reconstruct, operate and maintain" the SLA, including 
above ground improvements. 
58. Defendant has wrongfully entered the SLA corridor, trespassed on and damaged 
MWDSLS property interests, denied MWDSLS its rights and access to its real property interests, 
violated MWDSLS regulations, and endangered critical public infrastructure. 
59. MWDSLS is entitled to an order: i) enjoining Defendant from interfering with 
MWDSLS' restoration of the SLA corridor; ii) enjoining Defendant from future trespass upon 
MWDSLS' property interests; and iii) enjoining future violations of MWDSLS regulations. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION - DECLARATORY JUDGMENT/QUIET TITLE 
60. MWDSLS incorporates all previous paragraphs as though fully stated herein. 
6\. MWDSLS is entitled to an order: i) declaring MWDSLS property rights; ii) 
declaring MWDSLS' regulatory authority; iii) declaring MWDSLS' rights and powers to remove 
Defendant's improvements which infringe MWDSLS property rights, or which violate 
MWDSLS regulations; and iv) quieting MWDSLS' title. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION - DAMAGES 
62, MWDSLS has suffered, and continues to suffer, damages proximately caused by 
Defendant's trespass and regulatory violations. MWDSLS is entitled to a judgment for damages 
12 
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caused by Defendant's wrongful acts, including the costs to be incurred for restoration of the 
SLA corridor, together with court costs and interest. 
RELIEF REQUESTED 
WHEREFORE, MWDSLS requests an order and judgment as follows: 
A. Enjoining Defendant from interfering with MWDSLS' restoration of the 
SLA corridor; and 
B. Enjoining Defendant from any future trespass upon MWDSLS' property 
interests or violations of MWDSLS regulations; and 
C Declaring MWDSLS" property rights; and 
D. Declaring MWDSLS' regulatory authority; and 
E. Declaring MWDSLS' right and power to remove Defendant's 
improvements which infringe MWDSLS property rights, or which violate 
MWDSLS regulations; and 
F. Quieting MWDSLS * title; and 
G. For damages suffered by MWDSLS due to Defendant's actions, including 
costs to be incurred in restoring the SLA corridor, together with interest; 
and 
H. For costs incurred by MWDSLS in this action; and 
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I. For such other relief this Court deems appropriate and just. 
Signed this 26lh of October. 2010 
Plaintiffs.Address: 
3430 East Danish Road 
Sandy, Utah 84093 
SNOW, CHRISTENSKN & MAUTINEAU 
Shawn E. Draney 
Scott H. Mari in 
Attorneys for Plaintiff MWDSLS 
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VERIFICATION , 
STATE OF UTAH; : : ) 
: ss, 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Michael L. Wilson, being first duly sworn, upon his oath deposes and states that he is the 
General Manager of the Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake & Sandy ("MWDSLS") and is 
authorized by the MWDSLS Board of Trustees to verify the attached Verified Complaint, and 
that he is familiar with the contents of the foregoing Verified Complaint, and the allegations in 
the Verified Complaint are true as stated, to the extent of ray knowledge and/or regular business 
records of MWDSLS, except as to matters alleged upon mformation and belief, and as to those 
matters, he believes same to be true. 
DATED tliis ^ T d a y of October, 2010. 
'tfklbf ±-tM^ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before rhc this A'U day of October, 2010. 
/J 
$*#4J£LJ3$£L f ^ V ^ ^ -
Notary Public 
Residing at: .ftVffi' £ fo*trt& M 
My Commission Expires: 
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(Quitclaim Deed No. 1 under Contract No, 04-WC40-8950) 
QUITCLAIM DEED 
(Salt Lake Aqueduct, Salt Lake County Lands) 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (Grantor), acting by and throughthe Bureau of 
Reclamation, Department of the Interior, pursuant to the provisions of the Act of June 17,1902 
(32.Stat 388), and acts amendatory thereof or supplementary thereto, particularly the Provo River 
Project Transfer Act (Public Law i 08-382.118 Stat 2212), hereby quitclaims and conveys to 
MBTROPOUTAN WATER DISTRICT OF SALT LAKE & SANDY (Grantee), a political 
subdivision of the State of Utah, 3430 East Danish Road, Cottonwood Heights, Utah 84093, M 
Ten Dollars (Sl'0.00) and Other good bud valuable consideration, all of Grantor's right, title and 
interest in and to lands and interests in lands located in Salt Lake County,, Utah, commonly 
refewd to as the Salt Lake Aque&uct more particularly described in Exhibit A, attached.and by 
this reference made a part hereof, 
TOGETHER Wl fH, all facilities, equipment, improvements, fixtures. features ^d-appurtenances 
located h\ under or upon such lands or interests in lands, ^_ 
TOG£TH£R WITH the rights, privileges, duties, obligations, and responsibilities of the Grantor 
wtocH exisr. as of the date of this Quitclaim Deed, as a result of any, valid right>of-use agreements 
entered by,Grantor. The Grantee shall honor the terms of each such right-of-use agreement as 
dewibei fe-ihe Provo River Project Transfer Act and Contract No. 04-WC-40-8950, dated'"" 
KovembcefSf.?^. 
ALL OF THE ABOV& described lands or interests in lands, facilities, equipment, improvements, 
fixtures, features, and appurtenances are hereinafter collectively referred to as. the "Real Property'1. 
This Quitclaim Deed shall be interpreted as conveying all of Grantor's interest, pi*esent.and future, 
in aU lands, interests in lands, facilities, equipment, improvements, fixtures, features and 
appurtenances that in anywise are a part of or essential to the ownership, operation, or 
insiiniienancc of the Aqueduct Division of the Provo River Prefect lying or located within Salt Lake 
Cotinty. Utah, whether acqyired or constructed by or for Grantor, or-acquired or constructed by ox 
for Grantee, or constructed by or for others pursuant to righi-ofruse agreements, except as 
expressly excluded or reserved below. 
THIS CONVEYANCE DOES NOT INCLUDE OR MODIFY: 
1 <, Any interest in or to any National Forest system hmds crossed by the Salt Lake 
Aqueduct As to such lands, Grantor shall convey to Grantee, by separate instrument an 
appropriately sized, permanent easement for the use, operation, maintenance, repair, improvement, 
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and replacement of fbei Salt lake Aqueduct, as described in the Provo River Project Transfer Act 
aad Contract No-04-WC-4O-8950., . , . 
2. Any [interests in water rights or rights to usewatar* v - ^ -.., 
3, Any oil, gas or other mineral rights or interests held in the name of the United States: 
provided, however* that any future exploration for oil, gas or other "Federally owned minerals or 
minerals rights or interests underlying the Real Property shall be conducted in such a maimer as 
will not compromise the structural integrity of, or Interfere with the use, operation, maintenance, 
repair or replacement of, the Salt Lake Aqueduct,-or related facilities, equipment, improvements, 
fixtures, features or appurtenances; provided'farther that no surface occupancy for exploration or 
exploitation of oil, gas, or other Federally owned mineral? rights or interests shall be allowed on 
the Real Property. 
. THIS CONVEYANCE IS SUBJECT TO: , '• ' 
1. Oil, ga% and other imneral rights reserved of record by or in favor of third-parties as of 
the date of this Quitclaim Deed. 
2. Valid 'permits, licenses, leases, rights-or-use* or rights-of-way of record or outstanding 
on, over, or across the Real Property ia existence on the date of this Quitclaim Deed. 
3. A perpetual easement reserved by Grantor on, over, or across the Real Property to 
provide for lawful eoatirmed non-motorized public access to and across the Real Property for 
recreational purposes; provided that such non-motorized public use stall not interfere with the use, 
operation, -maintenance, repair, improvement, replacement or protection of the Salt Lake Aqueduct 
and related facilities, equipment improvements, fixtures, features and appurtenances, and such 
non-motorized public use shall be subject to all existing and future state, federal, local and Grantee 
statutes, rules, regulations, ordinances, policies and procedures regarding safety and security, 
4. Title to any equipment, improvements, fixtures, features and appurtenances which are 
part of theProvo River Project, Utah, Deer Creek Division, is hereby reserved to the Grantor. 
5. Title to any equipment, improvements, fixtures, features and appurtenances which are 
part of the Central Utah Project ia herehy reserved to the Grantor. ; . 
NOTICE IS HEl^BY "'/: ' "•:': •:: : -'.: •;'-:. '; .;• 
•1. Acting pursuant to the requirements of 40 CFR 373.cn April 23, May 3? and May 18, 
2006, the Grantor performed a hazardous waste survey of the Real Property, and a copy of said, 
survey was delivered to the Grantee in a letter dated September 26,2006. The Real Property 
conveyed herein to the Grantee is being conveyed in the same condition as existed on the date of 
, said survey and which is more particularly described in that survey. No remediation by the 
Grantor on behalf of the Chmtee has been or will be made. . 
2, The Grantee has used, and has had operation and maintenance responsibility for the 
Real Property for over 50 years. Grantee and its successors and assigns accept tire Real -Properly' 
2 
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"as is" and also accept liability for the Real Property from the date of this Quitclaim Deed 
forward. 
3, The Grantee, its successors and assigns shall ho responsible for the protection, 
identification, and preservation of cultural resources, if any, located on the Real Properly as 
required by the existing and future laws of the State of Utah,
 : -
4. Nothing in this Quitclaim Deed sh&ll be cons t a t 
abandonment, forfeiture, or relinquishment by the Grantor of its basic patent right reserved by the 
Act of August 30, 1890 (26 Stat, 391) as to the described lands for easements claimed, or to be 
claimed, for purposes other than the Salt Lake Aqueduct: ^ 
5;< Nothing in this Quitclaim Deed shall be construed or interpreted as altering or 
amending the terms or conditions of any United 'States contract, or supplements or amendments 
thereto, except as specifically provided in Article 20 of Contract Mo, 04-WC-4G-8950, dated 
November 23, 2004, 
6. If any further specific conveyances-should be necessary .hereafter, because of the 
discovery of additional Real Property not listed on the Exhibits, to more specifically and legally 
describe the Real Property, or because the Grantor acquires any title to or interest in the Salt Lake 
Aqueduct by reason of an4 instrument k the Grantor's chain of title, or by operation of law, then 
Grantor-shall make reasonable efforts to provide such conveyances, on the same terms and 
conditions set forth above. * -
' \ „ .7, Nothing in this Quitclaim Deed shall be construed or interpreted as creating any 
condition subsequent, reverter, or possibility of areyerter* 
TO HATE AND TO HOLD unto Grantee, and Grantee's successors and assigns, the Real 
Property; together with ail the rights and appurtenances thereto in anywise belonging, forever, 
WITNESS the hand of the Grantor this 2nd day of October, 2006. 




" i " ;••-,: ••-:' Rkk%.Qold 
Regional Director, Upper Colorado Region 
/ ' , Bureau of Reclamation 
- Acting.&r the Secretary of Interior 
of the United States 
Approved: . v; 
Umce of me Regional Solicitor 
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
;ss. 
On this 2ndtlay of October, 2006, personally appeared before me, Rick L. Gold, loiown to me to be 
the Regional Director of the Bureau of Reclamation, Upper Colorado Region, United States 
Department of the Interior, the signer of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that 
he executed the same on behalf of THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, pursuant to authority 




Notary Public in and for the State of Utah 
Residing at: ^ ^ i / ^ ^ ' 
„ P^JNg* BROWN! 
HxHm*r<miK*WMWifiM KM -m £*Bt i*Br SOUTH 
5$VfcQVftr MtAfr §460$ 
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ACCEPTANCE 
The parties intend for the above Quitclaim Deed to satisfy a portion of the terms of Contract No. 
04-WC-40-8950, dated November 23,2004', and a portion of the requirements of Public Law 108-
382. The Grantee accepts this Quitclaim Deed on the terms and conditions stated herein. The 
Grantee hereby further agrees and acknowledges that: (1) the Salt Lake Aqueduct skill no longer 
be regarded or Heated either as a Provo River Project or a United States facility, except with 
regard to Provo River Project water as provided for in Section 17 of Contract No. 04-WC-40-
8950, elated November 23,2004; the Grantee shall not be entitled to receive any future 
Reclamation benefits with respect to the Real Property, except for Unefm that would be available 
to other non-Reclamation facilities; and (3) to the fullest extent allowed by law, the Grantee agrees 
to indemnify and hold harmless the Grantor, its officers and employees from any claims, liabilities 
or other responsibilities which may arise subsequent to the date of this Quitclaim Deed which 
result from the Grantee's .use, operation, or maintenance of the Real Properly as described in this 
Qiiitclaim Deed. 
METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT 
OF SALT LAKE & SANDY 
lael L. Wilson, General. Manager 
Approved:^  
gha^f E. Drauey, A 
Co'unsei.-for Metrooolitan Water District of Salt Lake & Sandy 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
STATE OF UTAH . 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
:ss. 
On this 2nd day of October, 2006, personally appeared before me, Michael L. Wilson, known to rne 
to be the General Manager of the Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake & Sandy, the signer of 
the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same on behalf of 
Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake & Sandy, pursuant to authority delegated to him from the 







~Notaiy~Pnb1ic-"hrandrfe-tii^ Slate of Utah 
Residing at: 
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Paul M.Belnap, #0279 
Bradley Wm. Bowen, #5042 
Jennifer R. Carrizal, #10116 
STRONG &HANNI 
3 Triad Center, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
Facsimile: (801) 596-1508 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant ZdenekSorf 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT OF 






Case No. 20110443 
District Ct. No.: 100921025 
The above-named parties by and through their counsel of record hereby stipulate and 
agree that the Motion to Supplement Record on Appeal dated September 22,2011 filed by 
Appellant may be granted as follows: 
Exhibits 1 through 10 marked and provided to the Court by Appellant at the hearing 
dated March 8,2008 be added to the Record as exhibits referenced in the transcript of hearing on 
said date. Said exhibits are attached as Exhibit "A." 
The Appellee, Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake and Sandy, prepared and caused 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
OCT 11 2011 
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to be recorded (without input JBrom the Appellant on the content of the document or the fact of 
abandonment) the document entitled "Notice of Partial Abandonment of Easement" attached as 
Exhibit "B" to this Stipulation. The parties stipulate that this three-page document may be added 
to the record on appeal. 
DATED this / / day of October, 2011. 
STRONG &HANNI 
PaulM. Belnap 
Bradley Wm. Bowen 
Jennifer R. Carrizal 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
ZdenekSorf 
7% 
DATED this __ /__ day of October, 2011. 
SNOW, CHRISJENSE^& MARTINET 
ShawnJicDraney 
;R Martin 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee 
Metropolitan Water District 
003770.00701 
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Created: Feb. 17,2011 
9625 S.Mt. Jordan Road 
S-10-1107ZdenekSorf 
lo f2 
Approximate Distance from Center 
of the SLA Pipeline: 
Motorcycle Barn: 44 ft 
Gazebo/Jacuzzi: 48 ft 
Garden boxes: 31ft 
Equipment shed: 26 ft 
Water feature: 23 ft 
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When Recorded Return To: 
Metropolitan Water District 
of Salt Lake & Sandy 
ATTN: General Manager 
3430 E Danish Road 
Cottonwood Heights, Utah 84093 
J&Ot: ~* ft^Jl ?5 - ^ 7 . « * 7 ; t "*' 
fiftR'^ ^ 1 * ' -:~\::r :r'" "' 
/X^V&£fc> fe*Lj » #•'£ l ^ V « ' : , •:•' 
iv£"R?OP0LiT/%* yATST^Oi^.r f ^ ' s i " 
343C £ KkJSH ^ "" 
SAHDY UT 5 4 ^ 
9Vs Z# : , OE^TV - f!A 3 P, 
NOTICE OF PARTIAL ABANDONMENT OF EASEMENT 
NOTICE IS GIVEN TO ALL PERSONS that with regard to the property described 
herein, the METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT OF SALT LAKE & SANDY (the 
"District"), acting consistent with District policy & procedures, hereby abandons a portion of the 
easement interest held by the District through the Monte Bello Estates Subdivision, which 
easement includes portions of what is currently known as Lot 2 of said Subdivision. Said 
easement is more particularly described as: 
COMMENCING at a monument at the East Quarter (B%) Comer of Section 10, Township 3 
South, Range 1 East> Salt Lake Meridian; 
Thence, South 89°44,1.0" West, along the South Line of the Northeast Quarter (NEW) of said 
Section 10, a distance of 626.65 feet, and North 00° 15*50" West 1081.82 to the intersection of 
the South boundary of Lot 2 Monte Bello Estates as recorded in Book FF at Page 40 in the 
official records of the Salt Lake County Recorders Office, and the eenterline of the Salt Lake 
Aqueduct alignment; Thence, along said South boundary line North 89°56100" West 75.00 feet; 
(hence North 00°15,50fl West 7.28-feet to the intersection of West Easement line of that 
Easement recorded as Entry Number 1028090 in Book 457 at Page 221, and a line coincidental 
to the roofline at a South facing wall of an existing house being the POINT OF BEGINNING; 
thence North 1 l°29fO0rt East 30.89 feet along said West Easement line to a point on a line 
coincidental to the roofline at a North facing wall of said existing house; thence along said line 
South 82°44'52M East 2.07 feet to a comer coincidental to the corner formed by the rooflines at 
said North facing wall and an East facing wall of said existing house; thence South OT I^S'OS" 
West 30*81 feet along a line coincidental to the roofline at an East facing wall of said existing 
house to a comer coincidental to the corner fonned by the rooflines at said East feeing wall and a 
South facing wall of said existing house; thence along a line coincidental to the roofline at said 
South facing wall of said existing house North 82*44'52n West 4.35 feet to the point of 
beginning. Contains 99 Square feet more or less. 
The original easement granted to the District is a perpetual easement to construct 
and reconstruct, operate and maintain an underground pipeline and appurtenant 
structures. The District now abandons that portion of the original easement which is 
encumbered by a portion of the existing home. 
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The District's historical interest in the Subject Property is as follows: 
1. On February 4,1946, the District was granted a one hundred twenty-five 
foot wide perpetual easement by Warranty Deed of Easement, recorded on February 8, 
1946 as Entry No. 1028090, in Book 457, at Page 221 to 222, books and records of the 
Salt Lake County Recorder, 
2. On August 22,1952, the District transferred its easement to the United 
States of America, Bureau of Reclamation ("USER") by Warranty Deed of Easement 
recorded on September 11, 1962, in Book 953, at Pages 55 to 56, books and records of 
the Salt Lake County Recorder. 
3. On October 2,2006, US BR transferred its interests in the easement back 
to the District via Quit Claim Deed recorded on October 2,2006, as Entry No. 9862736, 
in Book 9359, Pages 6770 to 6929, books and records of the Salt Lake County Recorder. 
That transfer by USSR was pursuant to the terms of the Provo River Project Transfer 
Act, 118 Stat. 2212, Pub. Law. 108-382, and the contract autliorized by the Prove River 
Project Transfer Act, Contract No. 04-WC-40-8950. 
DATED this J 0 day of June, 201L 
METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT 
OF SALT LAKE & SANDY 
B y : ^ 
STATE OF UTAH ) / 
/Michael L. Wilson, General Manager 
ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the ^Y day of June, 2011, personally appeared before me Michael L, 
Wilson, the General Manager of the Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake & Sandy, 
who duly acknowledged to me that he signed the foregoing Notice of Partial 
Abandonment of Easement on behalf of the Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake & 
Sandy,, and that he signed the same for the purposes stated therein. 
NOTARY 
1773543 
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CHAPTER 16 
REGULATIONS FOR NON-DISTRICT USE OF 
SALT LAKE AQUEDUCT AND 
POINT OF THE MOUNTAIN AQUEDUCT 
RIGHTS OF WAY 
Last Updated: June 14,2010 
PREFACE 
This chapter of the P&P contains regulations governing the use of the Salt Lake 
Aqueduct (SLA) and Point of the Mountain Aqueduct (POMA) rights of way, 
construction, excavation, removal and/or placement of materials, or other earth work, on 
SLA and POMA rights of way, and construction near enough to SLA and POMA rights of 
way to potentially adversely impact those rights of wayt by persons or entities other than 
the District 
16-1 GENERAL BACKGROUND 
(1) SLA, The SLA is critical to the water supply of Salt Lake City's retail 
water service area, Sandy City's retail water service area, and other areas of Salt Lake 
County and Utah County. The U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation 
(Reclamation) designed and constructed the SLA under authority of the Reclamation Act 
of 1902 and the Public Works Administration Appropriation Act of 1938. Since 1938, 
the District has been responsible for the operation and maintenance of the SLA, has been 
repaying to the United States all costs incurred in constructing the SLA, and has been 
entitled to the use of the SLA. Pursuant to the Provo River Project Transfer Act, 
Pub.Law. 108-382, and a title transfer agreement among the District, the Provo River 
Water Users Association and the United States, title to the SLA was transferred to the 
District on October 2, 2006, 
(2) POMA, POMA is a pipeline and associated facilities constructed by the 
District to convey water to the District's member cities. The District owns POMA 
facilities and is responsible for the operation and maintenance of all POMA facilities. 
POMA is critical to the water supply of Salt Lake City's retail water service area, Sandy 
City's retail water service area, and other areas of Salt Lake County and Utah County. 
(3) The intent of this Chapter is to provide guidelines and authorization to 
staff for the licensing of uses of District corridors. Licenses should reasonably 
accommodate other uses of District corridors so long as it is clear that such uses will not 
materially interfere with the District's interests in the use, operation, maintenance, repair 
and replacement of District facilities. Except as otherwise directed by the Board, fees for 
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licenses should be reasonably calculated to generally recover direct and indirect District 
costs associated with evaluating, approving, and administering such licenses. The 
Engineering Committee or Board may authorize licenses in addition to those the staff is 
authorized to issue by this chapter, or make exceptions to the regulations, where doing so 
would serve the interests of the District and the public. 
16-2 GENERAL INTENT OF REGULATIONS 
(1) District Assumption of Reclamation Agreements. Reclamation has 
historically provided, by agreement, underlying fee owners, adjoining landowners, and 
others, the right to use portions of the SLA right of way pursuant to 43 United States 
Code, Section 387; 43 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 429, and Reclamation 
Manual/Directives and Standards LND 08-01. As a condition of title transfer, the District 
assumes all of the rights and responsibilities of Reclamation under validly existing 
Reclamation agreements for use of the SLA right of way. 
(2) District's Proprietary and Regulatory Interests, Portions of the SLA and 
POMA rights of way are held in fee, and portions are held under easement. Portions of 
the POMA right of way are located under roads or city parks pursuant to license or 
franchise agreements. The application of these regulations will necessarily vary 
depending upon the nature of the ownership interest of the District. Regardless of the 
nature of the District's ownership interest in the right of way, the District has regulatory 
authority as a subdivision of the State of Utah to protect District facilities. 
(3) Pair Market Value of Use of District Fee Lands, The District is generally 
obligated by state law to charge fair market value for use of fee lands. Eg, Salt Lake Co. 
Comm'n v. Salt Lake Co. Attorney, 985 P.2d 899 (Utah 1999); Municipal Building 
Authority of Iron Co. v. Lowder, 711 P.2d 273 (Utah 1985); Sears v. Ogden City, 533 
P.2d 118 (Utah 1975). The District's policy is that it will make reasonable efforts to 
comply with this requirement, and also reasonably recover the estimated actual costs to 
the District of processing and administering Encroachment Agreements, but will 
otherwise attempt to minimize charges. 
(4) SLA Rights Reserved by the United States. Pursuant to the Provo River 
Project Transfer Act, Pub.Law. 108-382, and a title transfer agreement among the 
District, the Provo River Water Users Association and the United States, the United 
States transferred the title of the SLA to the District and the United States reserved an 
easement for the continued, lawful, non-motorized public access across the SLA to 
adjacent public lands. The United States also reserved an easement for Central Utah 
Project facilities within Utah County, All uses of the SLA right of way are subject to 
these easements. The District's General Manager may deny a new or renewed 
encroachment agreement if the District or other agency has any outstanding 
encroachment issues with the applicant or related persons or entities. 
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(5) Security. The SLA and POMA are critical public infrastructure, and as 
such the use of SLA and POMA rights of way will be subject to federal, state, local and 
District statutes, regulations, rules, ordinances, policies and procedures designed to 
protect public health, safety and welfare. 
(6) Non-motorized Public Trail Development. The District believes that 
public, non-motorized recreational trail use of portions of the SLA and POMA rights of 
way can be developed in a manner that does not adversely impact the security of the SLA 
or POMA, and does not adversely impact the District's ability to use, operate, repair, 
inspect, maintain or improve SLA or POMA facilities. The District may allow such 
recreational trail development. 
(7) Non-licensed Encroachments. The District may periodically review its 
rights of way to identify non-licensed encroachments. The District may take action to 
remove such encroachments or bring encroachments in compliance with these 
regulations, including payment of all required fees and charges as applicable. 
16-3 DEFINITIONS 
(1) "Applicant" - A person or entity who applies for issuance of an 
Encroachment Agreement by the District 
(2) "District" - The Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake & Sandy. 
(3) "Encroachment Agreement" - The Agreement issued to a Grantee who 
has successfully completed the application process. 
(4) "Grantee" - The person or entity applying for and receiving an 
Encroachment Agreement from the District for use of SLA or POMA rights of way. Any 
reference in these regulations to "Grantee" should also be interpreted as referring to 
Grantee's contractors, subcontractors, employees, agents or representatives. 
(5) "Hazardous Materials" include: 
(a) Those substances included within the definitions of "hazardous 
substances", "hazardous materials", "toxic substances", or "solid waste" pursuant to the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, as 
amended, 42 U.S.C. Section 9601, et seq,, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
of 1976, as amended, 42 U.S.C. Section 6901, et seq., the Hazardous Materials 
Transportation Act, as amended, 49 U.S.C. Section 1981, et seq., and the regulations 
promulgated pursuant to such statutes. 
(b) Those substances listed in the United States Department of 
Transportation Table (49 CFR 172.101 and amendments thereto) or by the United States 
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Environmental Protection Agency as hazardous substances (40 CFR Part 302 and 
amendments thereto). 
(c) Such other substances, materials and wastes which are or become 
regulated or which are classified as hazardous or toxic under federal, state, or local laws, 
statutes, ordinances or regulations. This does not include public sewers, 
(6) "POMA" or "Point of the Mountain Aqueduct" - A large transmission 
pipeline that provides municipal and industrial water to the District's member cities. The 
District owns, operates and maintains POMA. 
(7) "Reclamation" or "Bureau of Reclamation" - A bureau of the United 
States Department of the Interior that designed and constructed the SLA and originally 
held title to the SLA. 
(8) "SLA" or "Salt Lake Aqueduct" - The SLA is a large transmission 
pipeline that provides municipal and industrial water to the District's member cities. 
Title to the SLA was transferred to the District on October 2, 2006 pursuant to the Provo 
River Project Transfer Act, Pub. Law. 108-382, and a title transfer agreement among the 
District, the Provo River Water Users Association and the United States, 
16-4 WRITTEN ENCROACHMENT AGREEMENT REQUIRED 
(1) Vehicle Access. Except where SLA or POMA is located under a validly 
existing public road, street or highway, a valid Encroachment Agreement is required for 
any vehicle access on or over the SLA or POMA. Weight restrictions for SLA and 
POMA pipe must be strictly observed. 
(2) Excavation, Earthwork, Construction. Etc. Any excavation, removal of 
material, placement of material or other earth work, or construction work on SLA or 
POMA rights of way where the District holds fee title or easement requires a valid 
Encroachment Agreement. 
(3) Improvements to Previously Approved Encroachments. Any 
improvement to a previously approved encroachment on District rights of way requires a 
new Encroachment Agreement. 
(4) Form of Encroachment Agreement. Encroachment Agreements shall be 
specifically tailored to reflect the proposed use by the Grantee and, therefore, may 
contain terms, conditions and/or limitations that are not reflected in previous or sample 
Encroachment Agreements. The District's General Manager is authorized to execute 
Encroachment Agreements that are consistent with these regulations and applicable law 
on behalf of the District. All activities conducted on SLA or POMA rights of way 
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pursuant to an Encroachment Agreement shall be in strict conformity with these 
regulations. 
(5) Encroachment Agreement Time Periods, The Encroachment Agreement 
is valid for the time period specified in the Encroachment Agreement. The maximum 
time period for an Encroachment Agreement is 25 years if the Encroachment Agreement 
is issued to a public agency or utility. If the Encroachment Agreement is issued to a 
private organization or home owner, the maximum time period is 15 years. 
(6) Encroachment Agreement Renewal. At the end of the effective time 
period, the Grantee shall remove the encroaching facility or renew the Encroachment 
Agreement. The Grantee shall pay all required fees and charges as applicable to renew 
the Encroachment Agreement. 
(7) Grantees Responsible for Employees, Contractors. Grantees are strictly 
liable for failure of their employees, agents, contractors or subcontractors to perform in 
strict conformity with the Encroachment Agreement and these regulations. 
(8) Public Use of District Rights of Way. Use of District rights of way by the 
public will not be permitted without a separate easement agreement requested by the 
Grantee and granted by the District prior to issuance of the Encroachment Agreement. 
16-5 APPLICATION PROCEDURES, FEES 
The District's General Manager is authorized to develop application forms, 
instructions, and procedures to guide the Grantee through the application process. The 
District's Board of Trustees shall adopt a fee schedule for application fees, processing 
fees, right of use fees, and any other fees consistent with these regulations. The Board 
may delegate to the General Manager the ability to establish appropriate fees for use of 
fee title lands. Fees for use of fee title lands may be waived in whole or in part by the 
General Manager to the extent that the licensed use is determined to be beneficial to the 
District (e.g., landscaping is developed and maintained by others). 
16-6 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS 
(1) Service Interruption. The SLA and POMA are pipelines that remain in 
service year-round and are critical to the water supply of hundreds of thousands of 
people. Service interruptions of either the SLA or POMA must be expressly 
authorized by the District's General Manager, and are not permitted except in very 
extraordinary circumstances. Unauthorized interruptions to pipeline service of the 
SLA or POMA will not be tolerated and could result in the responstble'party paying any 
and all incidental and consequential damages including, but not limited to: 
(a) Lost revenue from water sales; 
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(b) Engineering personnel time; 
(c) Operation and maintenance personnel time; 
(d) All costs required to return the affected pipeline back to its full 
service capacity; 
(e) Any costs incurred by the District's member cities that are over 
and above the normal costs associated with the affected pipeline; 
(f) The value of the water which could not be used due to the 
interruption; and 
(g) Third party claims tied to lack of water. 
Unauthorized interruptions of service will likely result in criminal and civil actions, 
particularly if determined to be willful or negligent. The District will participate in, 
and direct vigorous enforcement activities against any persons who cause, or who 
are associated with causing, any unauthorized interruptions in service of the SLA or 
POMA. 
(2) Contamination of Water Supply. Water conveyed by the SLA and POMA 
is used in a municipal and industrial water supply. The Grantee shall not introduce 
pollutants or place foreign materials of any kind in water conveyance facilities. In the 
event of a hazardous material spill, or if there is any release of materials into the water 
that may affect the operation of the SLA or POMA, the Grantee shall notify the District 
immediately. 
(3) Prior Notice 
(a) Following the issuance of an Encroachment Agreement, the 
Grantee shall invite the District to any Pre-Construction Meeting. 
(b) The Grantee shall contact the District either in writing or by phone 
at least one week in advance of any planned test excavation or construction activities 
within District rights of way. 
(4) Construction Activities 
(a) The Grantee shall designate a representative for field operations 
who shall be the sole representative of the Grantee and the Grantee's contractors in 
dealings with the District, and shall provide their name, address, and telephone number to 
the District prior to commencement of construction. 
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(b) The Grantee shall limit its construction to the approved 
encroaching facilities and construct the improvements strictly in accordance with the 
approved plans or specifications. 
(c) The Grantee shall notify the District upon completion of 
construction. 
(d) Within sixty (60) days after conclusion of construction operations, 
all construction materials and related litter and debris, including vegetative cover 
accumulated through land clearing, shall be disposed of in an appropriate manner. 
(5) Storage of Equipment or Materials. Equipment or materials shall not be 
stored on access roads, or other access areas, unless specific written approval is given by 
the District. Ail persons or entities using access roads shall coordinate with the District 
to allow District personnel access to any access roads. 
(6) Hazardous Materials, Pesticides, Pollutants 
(a) Storage, handling, use, or transportation of hazardous materials is 
strictly forbidden on or adjacent to any District right of way without the prior written 
permission of the District All state, federal and local statutes, rules, regulations and 
ordinances concerning the use of hazardous materials, insecticides, herbicides, 
fungicides, rodenticides, and other similar substances shall be strictly observed 
(b) Prior to the use of hazardous materials, insecticides, herbicides, 
fungicides, rodenticides, and other similar substances on or adjacent to District rights of 
way, the Grantee shall obtain, from the District, approval of a written plan for such use. 
The plan shall state the type and quantity of material to be used, the pest to be controlled, 
the method of application, and such other information as may be required. All use of 
such substances on or near the District rights of way shall be in accordance with the 
approved plan. If the use of a substance is prohibited by the Environmental Protection 
Agency, it shall not be used. If use of a substance is limited by the Environmental 
Protection Agency, it shall be used only in accordance with that limitation. 
(7) Vegetation. Restoration and Reseeding 
(a) Except as otherwise agreed by the District in writing, ground 
surfaces within District rights of way must be restored to a condition equal to that which 
existed before the encroachment work began, or as shown on the approved plans or 
specifications. 
(b) The Grantee shall exercise care to preserve the natural landscape 
and shall conduct its construction operation so as to prevent any unnecessary destruction, 
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scarring, or defacing of the natural surroundings in the vicinity of the work. Except 
where clearing is required for permanent works, ail trees, native shrubbery, and 
vegetation shall be preserved and shall be protected from damage that may be caused by 
the Grantee's construction operations and equipment unless otherwise directed by the 
District. Movement of crews and equipment within the rights of way and over routes 
provided for access to the work shall be performed in a manner to prevent damage to 
roadways, grazing land, crops, or property. 
(c) Plans for restoration of District rights of way areas where soils and 
surface materials are disturbed through actions incident to construction, operation, and 
maintenance shall be approved by the District, 
(d) The Grantee shall be responsible for prevention and suppression of 
all uncontrolled fires that are caused by the Grantee, its agents, or assigns. The Grantee 
shall be responsible for restoration of damaged areas. 
(8) Damage to District Facilities. All damage to District facilities shall be 
repaired by the Grantee to the satisfaction of the District. If emergency repair work is 
necessary, or the Grantee fails to complete all work covered by the applicable agreement 
with the District in a reasonable time as determined by the District, any remaining or 
incomplete work will be performed by the District and the Grantee will be required to 
reimburse the District for all expenses incurred by the District in completing the work. 
(9) Unanticipated Conditions. If unanticipated field conditions are 
encountered while a project is being undertaken, the District reserves the right to impose 
additional or more stringent requirements than may be generally described in this 
Chapter 16. The District may also issue a written amendment to the Encroachment 
Agreement. 
(10) Record Drawings. Within 30 days of completion of construction, the 
Grantee shall provide to the District three (3) copies of record drawings. The record 
drawings shall include, but not be limited to, X,Y,Z, GPS coordinates of District 
facilities, utility crossings, manholes, drains, power poles, etc. A topographic survey 
shall be completed to document any changes to grade. Electronic files of record 
drawings shall be submitted to the District in a format acceptable to the District. 
16 7 PROTECTION STANDARDS 
(1) Surface Structures 
(a) Surface structures are allowed within District rights of way so long 
as construction and use of those surface structures do not alter or interfere with the use, 
operation, maintenance, repair, replacement or improvement of any District facilities. 
Approved surface structures include asphalt roadways (without utilities), parking lots, 
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curbs, gutters, sidewalks, walkways , driveways and patios that are non-reinforced and not 
connected to buildings. All surface structures are subject to approval by the District on 
an individual basis. 
(b) Surface structures located over District pipelines shall be designed 
to meet maximum allowable loading restrictions and minimum cover requirements as 
determined by the District. 
(c) Except as otherwise expressly agreed in writing by the District, if 
the District determines that it is necessary to remove or damage surface structures for the 
use, operation, maintenance, repair, replacement, or improvement of any District 
facilities, repair or replacement of the removed or damaged surface structures will be the 
responsibility of the Grantee and its successors. 
(2) Buildings, Other Structures. Buildings and other permanent structures are 
not allowed to be constructed within or overhanging District rights of way. The 
following types of structures are not allowed; buildings, footings, foundations, retaining 
walls, block or concrete slab wails, decks, carports, trailers, light poles, flag poles, 
trampolines, motor cross facilities, power poles, swimming pools, wading pools or ponds, 
decorative pools or ponds, or similar water features. Other types of permanent structures 
not listed will be evaluated by the District for approval 
(3) Vehicle Access Weight Restrictions 
(a) No vehicular traffic will be allowed over Type A SLA pipe unless 
adequate protection is provided and specifications approved by the District. No vehicular 
traffic exceeding HS-20 loading will be allowed over Type B, C, and D SLA pipe unless 
adequate protection is provided and specifications approved by the District. 
(b) No vehicular traffic exceeding HS-20 loading will be allowed over 
the POMA unless adequate protection is provided and specifications approved by the 
District. 
(4) Reasonable and Efficient District Access 
(a) The District shall have reasonable and efficient access to all 
portions of District rights of way and facilities. No fences or similar barrier will be 
allowed within District rights of way except as consistent with these regulations. 
(h) Except for District purposes, installation of new or replacement 
fences is not allowed on District fee title property. Existing fences, previously authorized 
by agreement prior to October 2, 2006, on or across District fee title property may, by 
agreement, remain until District activities require removal, Other uses of District fee title 
property will be allowed as set forth in other sections of this chapter of the P&P. Fences 
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without footings or foundations may be allowed on property encumbered by District 
easements on a case by case basis. Concrete walls and masonry block walls will not be 
allowed. Grantee shall permit reasonable and efficient access to enclosed portions of 
District rights of way. 
(c) Fences enclosing District structures or rights of way shall provide 
gated openings large enough to permit reasonable and efficient access by District 
maintenance vehicles without damaging the fence and improvements of the District rights 
of way user. Grantee shall allow District to install District locks on access gates. 
(d) All fences within District rights of way are subject to removal by 
District as required to maintain or replace pipe or structures. Except as otherwise 
expressly agreed in writing by the District, removal and replacement of fences shall be 
the responsibility of the Grantee and its successors. 
(5) Trees and Vines 
(a) No new trees or vines will be allowed within District rights of way. 
Existing trees and vines within 20 feet of centerline of District pipelines or on access 
paths and roads used by District are not allowed Existing trees and vines outside 20 feet 
of centerline of District pipelines or on access paths and roads used by District may 
remain until removal is required for safe operation or replacement of the pipeline or 
access paths and roads at the sole discretion of the District. 
(b) All vegetation within the District rights of way shall be maintained 
by the property owner or Grantee, as the case may be. All vegetation within District 
rights of way is subject to removal by District as required to maintain or replace pipe or 
structures. Except as otherwise expressly agreed in writing by the District, removal and 
replacement of vegetation shall be the responsibility of the Grantee and its successors, 
(6) Changes in Ground Surfaces, Lateral Support 
(a) All temporary or permanent changes in ground surfaces within 
District rights of way are encroaching structures and require an encroachment agreement. 
Grantee is required to comply with District requirements for minimum and maximum 
depths of cover over the SLA and POMA. 
(b) Any fills and cuts on properties adjacent to District rights of way 
shall not encroach onto District rights of way without specific written prior approval by 
the District. Modifications of properties adjacent to District rights of way shall not 
reduce lateral support for District rights of way without specific written prior approval by 
the District. 
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(7) Drainage From or Onto District Rights of Way. Existing gravity drainage 
over and from District rights of way must be maintained at all times. Any erosion from 
construction, operation, maintenance or use activities must be controlled at all times. No 
new concentration of surface or subsurface drainage may be directed onto or under the 
District rights of way without a showing of adequate provisions for removal of drainage 
water, and the specific prior written approval of the District. 
(8) Test Excavation. Prior to final design of any structure that encroaches 
within District rights of way, an excavation must be made to determine the location of 
existing District facilities. Any such excavation must be made only by, or in the presence 
of, authorized District personnel. 
(9) Bedding for pipe or other District facilities. Compaction, Grantee is 
required to comply with District requirement related to bedding of pipe and other District 
facilities and compaction requirements. 
(10) Metallic Strip. Any nonmetallic encroaching structure below ground level 
shall be accompanied with an approved locator wire running through the entire length of 
the District right of way. 
(11) Utility Crossings 
(a) Utility crossings of District rights of way will require an 
encroachment agreement on an individual basis. Ail applicable state, city, and county 
regulations shall be adhered to in the construction of utilities. Where utilities will be 
constructed by or for a developer, but dedicated to a municipality or other local 
governmental entity or regulated public utility, the District will require the Encroachment 
Agreement to be signed by that municipality or other local governmental entity or 
regulated public utility. 
(b) All utility crossings shall provide a minimum of eighteen (18) 
inches of clearance between pipeline or conduit and the SLA or POMA. All sewer lines 
shall be installed in a carrier pipe extending a minimum of 25 feet each side of SLA or 
POMA centerline, as directed by the District. All culinary pipeline crossings under the 
SLA or POMA shall be installed in a carrier pipe extending a minimum of 25 feet each 
side of SLA or POMA centerline, as directed by the District Carrier pipes shall consist 
of either welded steel pipe or welded HDPE. Coating, lining and thickness of carrier 
pipes shall be approved by the District. 
(c) Angles of crossing utilities shall be 90 degrees in relation to the 
SLA or POMA whenever practicable, and not less than 60 degrees. Parallel utilities are 
not allowed within District rights of way. 
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(d) Metal pipes which are in close proximity to and may affect District 
pipelines shall implement corrosion protection measures that provide adequate protection 
of the District's pipelines. 
(e) Boring of utility crossings may be required by the District. 
Decisions will be made on an individual basis. 
(f) If material from the excavation is not suitable as backfill, it shall 
be removed from the site by and at the expense of the Grantee, 
(g) Any buried utility shall be accompanied with warning tape. This 
tape shall be located 12 inches above the structure and extend from right of way edge to 
right of way edge. 
16-8 APPEALS 
Any decision of the General Manager regarding District rights of way may be 
appealed to the Engineering Committee. All appeals shall be in writing explaining the 
reasons for the appeal. In order for appeals to be considered by the Engineering 
Committee, the written appeal must be received within 30 days following receipt of the 
decision of the General Manager and at least 10 business days prior to the next scheduled 
Engineering Committee meeting. Replies will be answered in writing. Any decision of 
the Engineering Committee regarding District rights of way may be appealed to the 
District's Board of Trustees. AH appeals shall be in writing explaining the reasons for the 
appeal. In order for appeals to be considered by the District's Board of Trustees, the 
written appeal must be received within 30 days following receipt of the decision of the 
Engineering Committee and at least 10 business days prior to the next scheduled Board of 
Trustees meeting. Replies will be answered in writing. 
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